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Abstract 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a potential free trade agreement (FTA) among 12, and perhaps 
more, countries (Figure 1). The United States and 11 other countries of the Asia-Pacific region—Australia, 
Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam—are 
negotiating the text of the FTA. With over 20 chapters under negotiation, the TPP partners envision the 
agreement to be “comprehensive and high-standard,” in that they seek to eliminate tariffs and nontariff 
barriers to trade in goods, services, and agriculture, and to establish or expand rules on a wide range of 
issues including intellectual property rights, foreign direct investment, and other trade-related issues. 
They also strive to create a “21st-century agreement” that addresses new and cross-cutting issues 
presented by an increasingly globalized economy. 
The TPP draws congressional interest on a number of fronts. Congress would have to approve 
implementing legislation for U.S. commitments under the agreement to enter into force. In addition, under 
long-established executive-legislative practice, the Administration notifies and consults with 
congressional leaders, before, during, and after trade agreements have been negotiated. Furthermore, the 
TPP will likely affect a range of sectors and regions of the U.S. economy of direct interest to Members of 
Congress and could influence the shape and path of U.S. trade policy for the foreseeable future. 
This report examines the issues related to the proposed TPP, the state and substance of the negotiations 
(to the degree that the information is publically available), the specific areas under negotiation, the policy 
and economic contexts in which the TPP would fit, and the issues for Congress that the TPP presents. 
The report will be revised and updated as events warrant. 
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Summary 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed regional free trade agreement (FTA) being 
negotiated among the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. U.S. negotiators and others describe and envision 
the TPP as a “comprehensive and high-standard” FTA that aims to liberalize trade in nearly all 
goods and services and include rules-based commitments beyond those currently established in 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). The broad outline of an agreement was announced on the 
sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) ministerial in November 2011, in 
Honolulu, HI. If concluded as envisioned, the TPP potentially could eliminate tariff and nontariff 
barriers to trade and investment among the parties and could serve as a template for a future trade 
pact among APEC members and potentially other countries. Congress has a direct interest in the 
negotiations, both through influencing U.S. negotiating positions with the executive branch, and 
by considering legislation to implement any resulting agreement.  
The TPP negotiations have been ongoing for nearly five years and may be concluded in the near 
term, although several challenging issues remain unresolved. These issues are likely the most 
sensitive for negotiating parties and may require political-level decisions to reach final 
agreement. The negotiating dynamic itself is complex. For example, decisions on key market 
access issues on auto, dairy, sugar, and textiles and apparel may depend on the outcome of rules 
negotiations involving intellectual property rights or state-owned enterprises, among other issues. 
Nearly 30 chapters are under discussion in the negotiations, and reports indicate that 9 have been 
finished. The United States is negotiating market access for goods, services, and agriculture with 
countries with which it does not currently have FTAs: Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, and 
Vietnam. Negotiations are also being conducted regarding disciplines on intellectual property 
rights, trade in services, government procurement, investment, rules of origin, competition, labor, 
and environment, among other issues. In many cases, the rules being negotiated are intended to be 
more rigorous than comparable rules found in the WTO. Some topics, such as state-owned 
enterprises, regulatory coherence, and supply chain competitiveness, may break new ground in 
FTA negotiations. As the countries that make up the TPP negotiating partners include advanced 
industrialized, middle income, and developing economies, the TPP, if implemented, may involve 
restructuring and reform of the economies of some participants. It also has the potential to spur 
economic growth in the region. 
As a leading trade policy initiative of the Obama Administration, the TPP serves several strategic 
goals. It is a manifestation of the Administration’s “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific, and if 
concluded, may serve to shape the economic architecture of the region. It has the potential to 
harmonize existing agreements with U.S. FTA partners, attract new participants, and establish 
regional rules on new policy issues facing the global economy—possibly providing impetus to 
future multilateral liberalization under the WTO. 
As the negotiations proceed, a number of issues important to Congress have emerged. One is 
whether the United States can balance its vision of creating a “comprehensive and high standard” 
agreement with a large and expanding group of countries, while not insisting on terms that other 
countries will reject. Another issue is how Congress will consider the TPP, if concluded. The 
present negotiations are not being conducted under the auspices of formal trade promotion 
authority (TPA)—the latest TPA expired on July 1, 2007—although the Administration informally 
is following the procedures of the former TPA. Different views exist regarding the appropriate 
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timing of potential TPA legislation relative to the possible conclusion of the TPP. Other issues 
include whether the current chapters included in the agreement appropriately address 
congressional trade policy concerns and how the potential agreement may impact the multilateral 
trading system and other trade negotiations, including for a proposed U.S.-EU Trans-Atlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) agreement. 
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Introduction 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a potential free trade agreement (FTA) among 12, and 
perhaps more, countries (Figure 1). The United States and 11 other countries of the Asia-Pacific 
region—Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, and Vietnam—are negotiating the text of the FTA. With over 20 chapters under 
negotiation, the TPP partners envision the agreement to be “comprehensive and high-standard,” in 
that they seek to eliminate tariffs and nontariff barriers to trade in goods, services, and 
agriculture, and to establish or expand rules on a wide range of issues including intellectual 
property rights, foreign direct investment, and other trade-related issues. They also strive to create 
a “21st-century agreement” that addresses new and cross-cutting issues presented by an 
increasingly globalized economy. 
The TPP draws congressional interest on a number of fronts. Congress would have to approve 
implementing legislation for U.S. commitments under the agreement to enter into force. In 
addition, under long-established executive-legislative practice, the Administration notifies and 
consults with congressional leaders, before, during, and after trade agreements have been 
negotiated. Furthermore, the TPP will likely affect a range of sectors and regions of the U.S. 
economy of direct interest to Members of Congress and could influence the shape and path of 
U.S. trade policy for the foreseeable future.  
This report examines the issues related to the proposed TPP, the state and substance of the 
negotiations (to the degree that the information is publically available), the specific areas under 
negotiation, the policy and economic contexts in which the TPP would fit, and the issues for 
Congress that the TPP presents. The report will be revised and updated as events warrant. 
The Evolution of the TPP 
The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, as it was originally known, was conceived in 
2003 by Singapore, New Zealand, and Chile as a path to trade liberalization in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Brunei joined negotiations in 2005, and the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 
(P-4) agreement was concluded in 2006. In March 2008, the United States joined the negotiations 
to conclude the still outstanding investment and financial services provisions. President Bush 
notified Congress of his intention to negotiate with the existing P-4 members on September 22, 
2008, and with other countries, Australia, Peru, and Vietnam, on December 30, 2008.  
The Trans-Pacific Partnership is perhaps the most ambitious trade negotiation underway in the world. It will 
break new ground on important issues from the challenges of state-owned enterprises, to ensuring the free flow 
of data across borders, to enhancing regional supply chains, to ensuring transparency in cutting red tape. We’re 
also working to strengthen protections for labor and the environment… Our goal is for high standards for the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership to enter the bloodstream of the global system and improve the rules and norms. 
—Vice President Joseph P. Biden, April 5, 2013 
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Figure 1. Trans-Pacific Partnership Countries 
 
Source: Analysis by CRS. Population and GDP data from IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2014. Trade data 
from the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC). Total trade includes both imports and exports, but does 
not include services trade. 
Notes: Trade data from 2014, GDP and population data from 2013. 
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After a period of reflection on U.S. trade policy, the Obama Administration decided to continue 
with the TPP negotiations. On November 14, 2009, President Obama committed the United States 
to engage with the TPP countries “with the goal of shaping a regional agreement that will have 
broad-based membership and the high standards worthy of a 21st-century trade agreement.”1 
President Obama formally notified Congress of his Administration’s intention to enter into 
negotiations with the TPP countries on December 14, 2009. That notification set off a 90-day 
timeline under the now-expired 2002 trade promotion authority (TPA) legislation, for 
congressional consultations prior to the beginning of negotiations.2 In October 2010, TPP 
participants agreed by consensus to the inclusion of Malaysia as a negotiating partner.  
The negotiating partners announced a framework for the agreement at the sidelines of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Ministerial in Honolulu, HI, November 8-13, 2011. 
Thereafter, Canada, Japan, and Mexico started to consult with the existing TPP partners on 
joining the negotiations. After several months of intense bilateral consultations with each of the 
current TPP countries, those countries agreed by consensus to the inclusion of Mexico and 
Canada and they began participating as negotiating partners in December 2012. Japan continued 
to debate internally the question of joining the negotiations, with Prime Minister Abe announcing 
Japan’s official interest in March 2013. After concluding bilateral consultations, Japan began to 
fully participate in the TPP negotiations in July 2013.  
2011 TPP Leaders Statement
At the 2011 APEC Leaders meeting in Honolulu, the leaders of the (then) nine TPP countries agreed to the 
broad outlines of an agreement. They categorized the TPP as “a comprehensive, next-generation regional 
agreement that liberalizes trade and investment and addresses new and traditional trade issues and 21st-century 
challenges.” TPP trade ministers also highlighted the following five key areas of the agreement. 
• Comprehensive Market Access—Removal of both tariff and nontariff barriers is “comprehensive and 
ambitious in all areas.” 
• Regional Agreement—Fully regional agreement that facilitates trade and the development of production 
and supply chains among TPP members. 
• Cross-Cutting Trade Issues—Holistic, agreement-wide approach to specific areas: regulatory coherence, 
competitiveness and business facilitation, small- and medium-sized enterprises, and development. 
• New Trade Challenges—Addresses emerging trade issues such as those caused by new technology (e.g., 
cloud-computing). 
• Living Agreement—Agreement will “evolve in response to developments in trade, technology or other 
emerging issues” and expand “to include other economies from across the Asia-Pacific region.” 
In early 2014, South Korea began consultations with the TPP negotiating partners over the 
possibility of joining, but at the time of this writing has yet to make a formal request to join the 
negotiations. It remains unclear whether the current 12 partners would permit another country’s 
participation before concluding the initial agreement, although the United States seems to favor 
waiting until the current negotiations are completed.3 There is as yet no formal limit to the 
                                                 
1 Remarks of President Obama at Suntory Hall, Tokyo, Japan, November 14, 2009. 
2 Although TPA expired in 2007, both the Bush and Obama Administrations have continued to adhere to its notification 
and consultation requirements. 
3 “Froman Welcomes Korean Interest in TPP, Says Entry Would Follow Initial Agreement,” BNA International Trade 
Daily, December 2, 2013. 
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potential membership of the TPP, aside from excluding those countries unwilling to commit to the 
ambition of the proposed FTA. All current members of the TPP negotiations are also members of 
APEC, and the TPP countries have stated that membership expansion will likely focus on other 
APEC members first, such as South Korea, though non-APEC countries with a focus on trade 
liberalization, such as Colombia and Costa Rica, have also expressed an interest in joining TPP. 
Current Negotiating Status 
The TPP negotiations remain ongoing through informal rounds, as well meetings among the chief 
negotiators and trade ministers. Both TPP leaders and ministers met on the sidelines of the 
November 2014 APEC meetings, but no major breakthrough was announced. A TPP Leaders 
statement following the meetings largely reiterated previous announcements, highlighting 
continued progress, and stating that “with the end coming into focus, we have instructed our 
ministers and negotiators to make concluding this agreement a top priority.”4 The most recent 
negotiating session occurred in Hawaii during March 9-13, 2015. Prior to this round, an 
Australian negotiator claimed that 9 chapters had been completed: competitiveness and business 
facilitation, cooperation and capacity building, cross-border trade in services, customs, 
development, regulatory coherence, small and medium enterprises, telecommunications and 
temporary entry.5 Congressional consideration of Trade Promotion Authority (see text box below) 
could have significant implications for the conclusion of the TPP negotiations.6 
Although the outstanding issues may be relatively limited, these issues are also likely the most 
challenging. The scope of tariff and agricultural quota removal or market access on sensitive 
products, particularly agricultural goods, as well as provisions over nontariff issues such as 
intellectual property rights, the environment, state-owned enterprises, and investment are 
reportedly among the most contentious unresolved issues. The United States’ bilateral market 
access negotiations with Japan have been challenging as Japan seeks to maintain import 
protections for several categories of sensitive agriculture products and the United States seeks to 
address concerns over nontariff barriers in the Japanese auto market. As the two largest TPP 
economies, these bilateral talks have significant implications for the broader 12-country TPP 
negotiations and the timing of their conclusion.  
Trade Promotion Authority
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)—formerly fast track—is a statutory mechanism under which Congress defines 
negotiating objectives and consultative and notification procedures for trade agreements, and authorizes the President 
to enter into reciprocal trade agreements governing tariff and nontariff barriers. Under TPA, implementing bills for 
reciprocal trade agreements are considered under expedited legislative procedures, that is, limited debate, no 
amendments, and an up-or-down vote. The expedited consideration is conditioned on the President observing certain 
statutory obligations in negotiating trade agreements, including notifying and consulting Congress. The purpose of 
TPA is to preserve the constitutional role of Congress to regulate foreign commerce in consideration of 
implementing legislation for trade agreements that require changes in domestic law, while also bolstering the 
negotiating credibility of the executive branch by assuring that a trade agreement, once signed, will not be changed 
during the legislative process. TPA expired in 2007, and TPA bills, H.R. 3830 and S. 1900, were introduced in the 
                                                 
4 USTR, “Trans-Pacific Partnership Leaders’ Statement,” November 10, 2014. 
5 “Australian Official Says Nine TPP Chapters Closed, Others Nearing Conclusion,” Inside U.S. Trade, March 13, 
2015. 
6 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. Trade Policy Agenda, 114th Cong., 1st sess., January 27, 
2015; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, President Obama’s 2015 Trade Policy Agenda, 114th Cong., 1st 
sess., January 27, 2015. 
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113th Congress but were never considered. Although high on the legislative agenda for certain Members of Congress 
and the Administration, no TPA legislation has been introduced in the 114th Congress as of this writing.7 
TPP in Strategic Context 
If completed as intended, the proposed TPP agreement would strengthen and deepen trade and 
investment ties among its participants. However, it may also have implications in larger, strategic 
contexts beyond the immediate participants: for U.S. trade policy in general; for the emerging 
trade architecture in the Asia-Pacific; for the multilateral trade regime within the WTO; and for 
U.S strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. The Obama Administration has argued that the 
strategic value of a potential TPP agreement parallels its economic value: 
TPP is as important strategically as it is economically. Economically, TPP would bind 
together a group that represents 40 percent of global GDP and about a third of world trade. 
Strategically, TPP is the avenue through which the United States, working with nearly a 
dozen other countries (and another half dozen waiting in the wings), is playing a leading role 
in writing the [trade] rules of the road for a critical region in flux.8 
President Obama reiterated the strategic significance of the TPP negotiations during his State of 
the Union address to the 114th Congress, arguing that the United States would benefit from 
developing the region’s trade rules as opposed to other regional actors, namely China.9 
The TPP and the “Rebalance” in the Asia-Pacific Region 
The centerpiece of our economic rebalancing is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)-a high-
standard agreement the United States is crafting with Asia-Pacific economies from Chile and 
Peru to New Zealand and Singapore.[ ... ] We always envisioned the TPP as a growing 
platform for regional economic integration. –Thomas Donilon, U.S. National Security 
Adviser, March 11, 2013. 
The TPP has potential implications beyond U.S. economic interests in the Asia-Pacific. The 
region is increasingly seen as being of vital strategic importance to the United States. Throughout 
the post-World War II period, the region has served as an anchor of U.S. strategic relationships, 
first in the containment of communism and more recently as a counterweight to the rise of China. 
This trend has recently been accentuated by the Obama Administration’s “pivot to Asia,” along 
with the perception that the center of gravity of U.S. foreign, economic, and military policy is 
shifting to the Asia-Pacific region. The TPP is viewed as an important element in the U.S. 
“rebalancing” toward Asia.10 
                                                 
7 For more information, see CRS Reports: CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of 
Congress in Trade Policy, by Ian F. Fergusson; CRS Report R43491, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently 
Asked Questions, by Ian F. Fergusson and Richard S. Beth; and CRS Report IF10038, Trade Promotion Authority 
(TPA), by Ian F. Fergusson. 
8 USTR, “Remarks by Ambassador Michael Froman at the Council on Foreign Relations: The Strategic Logic of 
Trade,” June 16, 2014, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2014/June/Remarks-USTR-
Froman-at-Council-Foreign-Relations-Strategic-Logic-of-Trade. 
9 U.S. President (Obama), “Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address,” January 20, 2015, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015. 
10 For more information, see CRS Report R42448, Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” 
(continued...) 
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TPP and U.S. Trade Policy 
U.S. participation in TPP negotiations serves several strategic goals in U.S. trade policy. First, it 
continues and expands a U.S. trade policy strategy that began with the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which entered into force in 1994, of using FTAs to promote trade 
liberalization and potentially to spark multilateral negotiations in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). The George W. Bush Administration expanded the use of this strategy under the rubric of 
“competitive liberalization,” negotiating 11 FTAs with 16 countries. The last three of these 
FTAs—with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea—were approved by Congress in 2011.11 
However, the future direction of this policy was uncertain, given the low commercial value of 
some of these agreements and lack of new obvious partner countries. Meanwhile, an increasing 
web of bilateral and regional FTAs, were being concluded among other parties in the Asia-Pacific 
region and worldwide. The Bush Administration’s and, then, the Obama Administration’s support 
for negotiating a TPP agreement signaled that the United States remains engaged in regional free 
trade negotiations.  
The TPP arguably provides the United States with the opportunity to project its trade interests by 
negotiating a “comprehensive and high standard” FTA with provisions that build on those in 
FTAs the United States concluded throughout the 2000s, especially the most recent FTAs, such as 
the U.S.-Korea FTA (KORUS). The TPP partner countries share a reliance on world trade and 
have been some of the greatest advocates for trade liberalization. While they differ in economic 
levels of development, they have committed themselves to negotiating a comprehensive FTA. 
That, by itself is not new; the United States has often conducted asymmetrical negotiations with 
countries of differing levels of development in which it has dominated. This time, however, with 
more players at varied levels of development, and with an economic heavyweight like Japan 
participating, concluding the negotiations may require greater compromise by all participants.  
Practically speaking, the TPP approach could eclipse the alternative model of narrower goods-
based FTAs that are offered by China, or other countries, or somewhat more comprehensive 
agreements used by the European Union and Japan that, nonetheless, exclude sensitive agriculture 
products. Adoption of these other models, even if open to U.S. participation, could be seen as 
disadvantageous to U.S. farmers, businesses and workers because they exclude provisions 
important to U.S. commercial trade—agriculture, disciplines on services, investment, and 
intellectual property rights, as well as enforceable provisions on labor and environment. In 
addition, the TPP aims to establish disciplines on new trade issues, such as state-owned 
enterprises or supply chain facilitation that could serve as a model for future negotiations 
bilaterally, regionally, or in the WTO. 
The TPP and the WTO 
Though structured as a regional FTA, the TPP may have an impact on the multilateral process of 
the WTO and the Doha Development Agenda (Doha Round) of multilateral trade negotiations. 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
Toward Asia, coordinated by Mark E. Manyin. 
11 The United States now has FTAs in force with 19 countries. These countries include Australia, Bahrain, Canada, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Jordan, Mexico, 
Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Peru, South Korea, and Singapore.  
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While the WTO ministers continue to discuss a Doha Round agenda that critics contend is 
increasingly irrelevant to the present trading system, the TPP represents a way for the United 
States and its partners to advance discussions of a “21st-century trade agenda.”  
The influence of the TPP impact could be great due to its potential expansion and, hence, the fact 
that it could eventually affect a substantial amount of world trade—over 60% of U.S. trade alone 
is with other APEC members. The debate over whether FTAs have a positive or negative effect on 
the multilateral system continues. Proponents of bilateral and regional agreements would argue 
that12  
• successful negotiation and implementation of proposed new trade rules in the 
TPP, on such emerging issues as state-owned enterprises and regulatory 
coherence, could serve as a template for future WTO negotiations;  
• a successful TPP agreement among the current negotiating partners could cause 
other regional economies to consider joining (as seen with the addition of 
Canada, Japan, and Mexico) in order to ensure they remain competitive in TPP 
markets, thus furthering the WTO goal of greater global trade liberalization; and 
• TPP could help promote and ensure the longevity of domestic economic policy 
reforms, particularly for countries such as Vietnam.  
Opponents, however, would counter that 
• efforts toward the TPP and other regional/bilateral FTAs may divert attention and 
resources from multilateral WTO efforts; 
• increased trade among TPP members due to the preferential tariff structures of 
the agreement could simply be diverted from other regions rather than be newly- 
created; and 
• the spread of FTAs may actually make international commerce more difficult as 
companies must navigate varying rules and standards associated with different 
agreements.13 
This last issue of overlapping trade rules may be particularly relevant for the potential TPP 
agreement as it will encompass countries with numerous existing FTAs. The proposed TPP 
agreement could add another layer of complexity or it could simplify the existing trade rules in 
the region by unifying them under one agreement. For example, according to the USTR, the TPP 
countries have committed to establishing a common set of rules of origin for determining whether 
a product originates inside the TPP.14 How these and other trade rules inside the potential TPP 
agreement relate to those in existing FTAs will be of interest moving forward. 
                                                 
12 These arguments regarding FTAs have been placed in a TPP context, but are drawn largely from Jeffrey J. Schott, 
“Free Trade Agreements: Boon or Bane of the World Trading System,” in Free Trade Agreements US Strategies and 
Priorities, ed. Jeffrey J. Schott (Institute for International Economics, 2004). 
13 This is the so-called “spaghetti bowl” effect of FTAs put forward by Jagdish Bhagwati, Professor of Economics and 
Law at Columbia University. For his thoughts on the TPP see his article in the International Monetary Fund’s Finance 
and Development magazine at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/12/bhagwati.htm. 
14 USTR, “Outlines of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,” fact sheet, November 2011, http://www.ustr.gov/
about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/outlines-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement. 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations and Issues for Congress 
 
Congressional Research Service 8 
The TPP and Other Asia-Pacific Trade Agreements 
The current 12 TPP countries already form part of a growing network of Asia-Pacific FTAs 
(Figure 2). The United States has FTAs in place with six of the TPP countries: Australia, Canada, 
Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore. In addition, the proposed TPP seeks to build on the existing 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (P-4), a free trade area among Brunei, Chile, New 
Zealand, and Singapore. The current TPP partners also include 4 of the 10 members of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.15 
ASEAN countries have negotiated a free trade area amongst each other as well as several external 
FTAs. All 12 TPP partners are also members of the 21-member Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum, which does not negotiate FTAs among its membership, but serves as 
a forum for dialogue on and establishes nonbinding commitments toward the goals of open and 
free trade and investment within the region.16  
To some, the United States and its TPP partners are jump-starting the consensus-based approach 
of APEC. In the context of this forum for dialogue and nonbinding commitments, APEC Leaders 
in 2010 agreed to push forward the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), 
and it continues to be a broad vision for the group. They acknowledged the TPP as potentially one 
of a number of “ongoing regional undertakings” on which to build to eventually achieve an 
FTAAP.17 Other ongoing regional undertakings include potential trade agreements between 
ASEAN and other Asian countries.  
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), for example, would join ASEAN 
and its six FTA partners—Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—in one 
collective FTA. It is unclear how these two regional undertakings, RCEP and TPP, may impact 
one another and how they will affect the potential for an FTAAP.18 The RCEP may not aim for the 
same level of ambition in terms of tariff reduction and trade liberalization as the TPP. By allowing 
sensitive items or rules to be left out of the negotiations, this platform could be more appealing to 
countries less inclined to the declared, if thus far unrealized, high-standard ambitions of the TPP. 
Yet, several countries, including Australia, Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and 
Vietnam, are moving forward as negotiating partners in both the TPP and RCEP and view these 
negotiations as complementary. The TPP partners, including the United States, have also 
expressed an interest in expanding the TPP to additional countries across the Asia-Pacific region. 
They maintain that new members are welcome so long as they strive for the same level of trade 
liberalization as the current negotiating partners. 
                                                 
15 The 10 ASEAN members are Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
16 APEC consists of Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong (officially Hong Kong, China), Indonesia, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan (officially, Chinese Taipei), Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. 
17 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, 2010 Leaders’ Declaration, November 2010, http://www.apec.org/Meeting-
Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2010/2010_aelm.aspx. 
18 A recent quantitative study by the East-West Center and the Peterson Institute considers the possibility of TPP and 
ASEAN+ agreements simultaneously expanding in the Asia-Pacific and models the welfare gains from each agreement 
eventually leading to an FTAAP. Due to the assumption that the TPP agreement would involve greater liberalization, 
the model predicts greater welfare benefits from an FTAAP based on the TPP. See textbox “TPP Economic Impact 
Predictions” below for more information. 
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Figure 2. Existing FTAs among TPP Countries 
 
Source:WTO FTA database and websites of TPP countries’ trade ministries. Trade data from IMF. 
Notes: Aggregate TPP goods trade, both imports and exports, as reported above. ASEAN also includes 
countries outside the TPP: Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, and Thailand. TPP 
goods trade covered by existing FTAs, as depicted above, reflects all goods trade between FTA partners. This 
measure slightly overstates trade covered under FTAs, as most FTAs exclude market access for at least some 
goods. 
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Many policy observers note the absence of China, the region and world’s second-largest 
economy, from the ongoing negotiations. At a November 20, 2013, speech, National Security 
Advisor to the President Susan Rice reiterated U.S. policy that, “we welcome any nation that is 
willing to live up to the high standards of this agreement to join and share in the benefits of the 
TPP, and that includes China.”19 The degree to which a potential TPP agreement and its 
participants are prepared to include China, as well as China’s willingness or interest in 
participating in a comprehensive agreement, will help determine if the TPP truly has the potential 
to become an FTAAP. With the agreement’s focus on expansion throughout the region, the current 
negotiating partners may wish to establish disciplines now on certain aspects of the Chinese and 
other Asia-Pacific economies. This may, in part, explain the push for potential new disciplines on 
state-owned enterprises inside the TPP. 
Economic Significance20 
The overall economic impact of the potential TPP agreement will likely depend on a number of 
factors, including the extent of the trade liberalization achieved in the agreement, as well as the 
current level and potential growth of trade and investment among TPP members. On both 
measures, the TPP appears significant given that the TPP would be the largest U.S. FTA by trade 
flows ($727 billion in U.S. goods exports and $882 billion in imports in 2014), and the TPP 
negotiators have expressed their intent to achieve a "comprehensive and high-standard" FTA that 
will broadly liberalize regional trade and investment. From the U.S. perspective, a significant 
share of this liberalization has already occurred from existing U.S. FTAs with 6 of the 11 TPP 
partners, although potential disciplines in areas not covered in previous FTAs may be significant 
for some sectors (Figure 3). 
Japan's entry into the negotiations greatly increased the potential economic significance of the 
agreement. Among the U.S. negotiating partners in the TPP, Japan is the largest economy and 
largest trading partner without an existing U.S. FTA (and hence, with greater scope for trade 
liberalization with the United States). In 2014, Japan was the United States’ fourth largest goods 
export ($67 billion) and import ($134 billion) market. As high income countries, U.S.-Japan trade 
differs considerably from U.S. trade with the other negotiating partners, many of them lower to 
middle income nations, without U.S. FTAs. Hence, Japan's participation in the agreement has 
drawn the interest of a wide range of U.S. industries, including sectors like agriculture, 
automotive, and services. 
Malaysia and Vietnam also stand out among the TPP countries without existing U.S. FTAs, both 
in terms of their current trade and investment with the United States and their potential for future 
growth. Together these countries have a population of over 120 million and their economies have 
experienced rapid growth in recent years.21 Moreover, Malaysia's and Vietnam's average applied 
most-favored nation tariffs—the average tariff on imports—are 6% and 9.5%, respectively, two of 
                                                 
19 Susan E. Rice, “America’s Future In Asia,” November 30, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/
11/21/remarks-prepared-delivery-national-security-advisor-susan-e-rice. 
20 For more information, see CRS Report R42344, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Countries: Comparative Trade and 
Economic Analysis, by Brock R. Williams. 
21 Vietnam’s GDP growth has slowed somewhat relative to the high rates it achieved during the past decade. In 2013 its 
growth rate was 5.4%, according to the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook, compared to an 
average growth rate of 7.3% in the period 2001-2010. 
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the highest levels among TPP members. Both nations also have substantial state sectors which 
may be affected by TPP outcomes.  
Figure 3. U.S.-World, APEC, and TPP Trade 
(2014) 
 
Source: CRS analysis. Data from the U.S. International Trade Commission. 
Key U.S.-TPP Trade Statistics
• TPP countries collectively represent the largest U.S. trading partner, accounting for 41% of total U.S. goods trade 
in 2014 and 24% of total U.S. services trade in 2013; 
• U.S. FTAs already exist with 6 U.S. trading partners among TPP participants, which account for 74% of U.S. goods 
trade with TPP partners in 2014 and 52% of U.S.-TPP services trade in 2013; and 
• the agreement has the potential to expand in an economically important region, and most recently, has expanded 
to include Japan, a country without an existing U.S.-FTA and which accounted for 5% of all U.S. goods trade in 
2014 and 7% of all U.S. services trade in 2013. 
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TPP Economic Impact Predictions
Several studies in recent years have attempted to project the long-term impact of the potential TPP on member and 
nonmember states. The absence of a concrete agreement makes it extremely difficult to accurately calculate such impacts. 
Without access to clearly defined tariff reduction timetables and NTB removal guidelines, there are necessarily many 
assumptions involved in any attempt to model TPP’s future effects on total welfare. Because of these uncertainties, the 
results of these existing studies should be interpreted with caution. 
The primary model to be published in recent years is a 2011 study by Peter Petri, Michael Plummer, and Fan Zhai for the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE).22 The authors continue to update the model with some regularity 
(most recently in April 2013) and publish raw output on their website.23 Most recent data show modest net gains for the 
United States in all TPP scenarios. In a TPP agreement including South Korea and Japan, they project the United States to 
see welfare gains of about $36 billion above a baseline projection (or 0.19% of baseline GDP). 
These gains will not be spread uniformly throughout the economy, according to the model. They project the U.S. 
manufacturing sector to experience a $44 billion drop in total welfare from baseline, and the agriculture and mining 
sectors to see a combined near-zero increase. However, the services sector is projected to see welfare gains of more than 
$79 billion, offsetting the negative impact on manufacturing. 
A 2012 study by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) projects a welfare increase of near-zero with 
complete elimination of import tariffs. Assuming the additional elimination of all NTB costs in goods and services, the 
paper projects a U.S. welfare gain of 0.22% of GDP.24 
A 2014 paper co-authored by a Purdue University economist makes findings that are similar to those of the Peterson 
model. The study projects U.S. annual welfare gains by 2025 of $33 billion above a baseline, only slightly lower than the 
Peterson outlook.25 
Other studies include a 2013 paper by the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), which focuses on median wage 
impact rather than total welfare. Author David Rosnick suggests that at best, TPP will have a near-zero impact on U.S. 
median wages by 2025 and may be directly responsible for a 0.6% drop in U.S. median wage.26 The methodology used in 
this study is based on extrapolating the change in U.S. trade balances following the implementation of other trade 
agreements, such as NAFTA, and using it to predict the impact of TPP, and differs considerably from the computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) models used in the other studies cited.27 
Note: This section was prepared by Gabriel Nelson. 
 
U.S.-TPP Trade and Investment 
U.S. trade with TPP countries was more than $1.6 trillion in merchandise in 2014 and more than 
$273 billion in services in 2013, the most recent periods for which data are available (Table 1 and 
Table 2). U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) into TPP countries totaled nearly $86 billion in 
2013, while TPP countries invested more than $69 billion in the United States (Table 3). Even 
                                                 
22 Peter Petri, Michael Plummer, and Fan Zhai, The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Asia-Pacific Integration: A 
Quantitative Assessment, Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2011: http://www.usitc.gov/
research_and_analysis/documents/petri-plummer-zhai%20EWC%20TPP%20WP%20oct11.pdf. 
23 Peter Petri, Michael Plummer, and Fan Zhai, “Asia-Pacific Trade,” April, 2013: http://asiapacifictrade.org/. 
24 Chunding Li and John Whalley, “China and the TPP: A Numerical Simulation Assessment of the Effects Involved,” 
National Bureau of Economic Research, May, 2012: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18090.pdf. 
25 G. Badri Narayanan and Sachin Kumar Sharma, Centre for WTO Studies, “An Analysis of Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP): Implications for Indian Economy,” May, 2014: http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/workingpaper/workingpaper14.pdf. 
26 David Rosnick, Center for Economic and Policy Research, “Gains from Trade? The Net Effect of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement on U.S. Wages,” September, 2013: http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/TPP-2013-
09.pdf. 
27 For more on economic analysis of trade agreements, see CRS Report R41660, U.S.-South Korea Free Trade 
Agreement and Potential Employment Effects: Analysis of Studies, by Mary Jane Bolle and James K. Jackson. 
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before Canada and Mexico became negotiating partners in the TPP, the agreement had the 
potential to become the second-largest U.S. FTA by trade flows. Now with the NAFTA countries 
and Japan participating, the TPP has the potential to become the largest U.S. FTA  
The current group of 12 countries is diverse in population, geographic location, and economic 
development, and U.S. trade relations with the countries reflect this diversity. The major U.S. 
merchandise exports are fairly similar to most TPP countries and include motor vehicles and 
parts; petroleum and coal products; computer equipment, semiconductors, and electronic 
components; agriculture and construction machinery; and aircraft. However, the top U.S. 
merchandise imports vary greatly by country. Agriculture and natural resources products are key 
U.S. imports from Australia, Chile, New Zealand, and Peru, while apparel products are the main 
U.S. imports from Vietnam. Canada and Mexico are both major suppliers of crude oil to the 
United States, but they also supply manufactured products like motor vehicles and motor vehicle 
parts. U.S. imports from Malaysia and Singapore consist primarily of manufactured products such 
as computers, semiconductors, and electronic components. Motor vehicles and motor vehicle 
parts make up nearly 35% of U.S. goods imports from Japan. 
In terms of value, Canada and Mexico are by far the largest U.S. trading partners among TPP 
countries in goods, and both are significant U.S. services trade and investment partners. Both 
countries share a large border with the United States and are among the oldest U.S. FTA partners. 
Japan is the third-largest U.S.-TPP goods trade partner, and second-largest services trade and 
investment partner. Considering the other eight TPP partners, Singapore and Australia are the top 
U.S. goods export markets and top overall services trade and investment partners with the United 
States, while Malaysia, Vietnam, and Singapore are the top sources of U.S. goods imports. 
Figure 4. Largest U.S. FTAs—Goods 
(2014) 
 
Source: Analysis by CRS. Data from ITC. 
Notes: Services trade data not available for all FTA partners. T-TIP refers to the proposed Trans-Atlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership FTA with the European Union. 
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Figure 5. Largest U.S. FTAs—Services 
(2013) 
 
Source: Analysis by CRS. Data from BEA. 
Notes: Services trade data not available for all FTA partners. T-TIP refers to the proposed Trans-Atlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership FTA with the European Union. 
Table 1. U.S. Goods Trade with TPP Countries, 2014 
(in millions of U.S. dollars, ordered by total trade) 
Country Exports Imports Balance Total Trade 
Canada 312,125 346,063 -33,938 658,188 
Mexico 240,326 294,157 -53,831 534,483 
Japan 66,964 133,939 -66,975 200,903 
Singapore 30,532 16,463 14,069 46,995 
Malaysia 13,136 30,448 -17,312 43,584 
Australia 26,668 10,670 15,998 37,338 
Vietnam 5,725 30,584 -24,859 36,309 
Chile 16,630 9,491 7,139 26,121 
Peru 10,070 6,079 3,991 16,149 
New Zealand 4,261 3,980 281 8,241 
Brunei 550 32 518 582 
Total 726,987 881,906 -154,919 1,608,893 
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission. 
Notes: U.S. general imports, U.S. total exports. 
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Table 2. U.S. Private Services Trade with TPP Countries, 2013 
(in millions of U.S. dollars, ordered by total trade) 
Country Exports Imports Balance Total Trade 
Canada 63,281 30,452 32,829 93,733 
Japan 46,270 30,006 16,264 76,276 
Mexico 29,855 17,766 12,089 47,621 
Australia 19,136 6,948 12,188 26,084 
Singapore 11,404 5,559 5,845 16,963 
Chile 3,608 1,207 2,401 4,815 
New Zealand 2,110 1,516 594 3,626 
Malaysia 2,687 1,481 1,206 4,168 
Total 178,351 95,221 83,130 273,572 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. International Services, Detailed Statistics for Cross-Border Trade, 
Table 2. 
Notes: BEA does not collect services trade data from every partner country. 
Table 3. U.S. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) with TPP Countries, 2013 
(in millions of U.S. dollars, ordered U.S. FDI Flow Abroad) 
Country U.S. FDI Abroad 
(Flow) 
U.S. FDI Abroad 
(Stock) 
FDI in U.S. (Flow) FDI in U.S. 
(Stock) 
Canada 23,155 368,297 23,336 237,921 
Australia 22,951 158,996 -3,079 44,742 
Singapore 17,452 154,438 1,148 19,760 
Mexico 7,626 101,454 3,130 17,610 
Chile 3,624 41,110 62 487 
Peru 1,425 10,061 -20 100 
Japan 7,368 123,174 44,861 342,327 
Malaysia 2,724 16,409 -41 635 
New Zealand -846 7,919 -39 972 
Vietnam 234 1,398 -287 -276 
Brunei 16 132 (D) (D) 
Total 85,729 983,388 69,071 664,278 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Notes: (D) denotes information suppressed to protect individual company data. 
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Negotiating Topics in TPP (Potential Chapters)
Goods Market Access 
Agriculture Market Access 
Textiles and Apparel 
Customs/Trade Facilitation 
Rules of Origin 
Technical Barriers to Trade 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards 
Services 
Investment 
Financial Services 
Telecommunications  
E-Commerce/Digital Trade 
Temporary Entry 
Intellectual Property Rights 
Government Procurement 
Competition/State-owned Enterprises 
Trade Remedies 
Transparency 
Labor 
Environment 
Cooperation and Capacity Building 
Regulatory Coherence 
Business Facilitation and Competitiveness (supply chains) 
Development 
Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
Institutional Chapters 
 -Dispute Settlement 
 -Living Agreement 
 -Exceptions 
 -Definitions 
 
Source: Previous U.S. FTA chapters and USTR press releases on TPP negotiations. 
Core Negotiating Issues: Market Access 
Market access for goods, services, and agriculture often forms the crux of FTA negotiations. 
However, nontariff barriers such as technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phytosanitary 
standards, while considered rules, also have an impact on market access. Negotiations on these 
latter issues are designed to ensure that, as tariff barriers are reduced, they are not replaced by 
other forms of protection.  
Market Access for Goods and Services  
A fundamental element of most FTAs is commitments among FTA partners to eliminate most, if 
not all, tariffs and quotas on their trade in goods. Current average most-favored nation (MFN) 
tariff levels for TPP countries vary from 0% to nearly 10% (Figure 6). The TPP will include tariff 
phase-out schedules that cover more than 11,000 commodity categories for each of the partner 
countries. At their November 2011 meeting in Honolulu, the TPP trade ministers stated that they 
are aiming for duty-free access for trade in goods. The tariff schedules likely will provide for 
phase-out of tariffs, with tariffs on many products phased-out immediately when the agreement 
enters into force, and tariffs on more sensitive products phased out over longer and varying 
periods of time. All of the current TPP countries are in the process of some tariff elimination as 
each has an FTA with one or more of the other TPP partners. As mentioned above, the United 
States has free trade agreements with Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore, and 
the original P-4 countries have already negotiated FTA provisions among themselves. The TPP 
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may build on these previous commitments and harmonize tariff elimination for all members. TPP 
partners are also discussing provisions that deal with export and import licensing procedures, 
customs issues, and trade facilitation. 
Figure 6. TPP Country Tariffs 
 
Source: WTO Tariff Profiles. 
Notes: These are the WTO-wide average MFN applied tariff rates, and hence do not reflect FTA tariff rates 
(e.g., the average tariff applied to U.S. exports to Canada and Mexico would be much lower due to NAFTA). 
Textiles, Apparel, and Footwear 
Differences are likely to arise between the developed countries and some of the developing 
countries, including Vietnam, over elimination of tariffs on labor-intensive products, such as 
textiles and apparel and footwear. The United States, for example, has included in its FTAs long 
tariff phase-out periods, special safeguards, and restrictive rules of origin (see below) to protect 
U.S. domestic producers from the adverse effects of import-sensitive products. For example, 
certain U.S. footwear manufacturers have argued for maintaining high tariffs on imported 
footwear, while some U.S. producers and retailers and Vietnam are pressing for lower tariffs to 
gain greater access to the U.S. market.28 Developing countries have argued that they need 
preferential access to the large markets in order to compete with producers from other countries, 
such as China.29  
Trade in Services 
A high priority for the United States in its negotiations of bilateral and regional free trade 
agreements has been increased market access for services providers, especially financial services, 
including insurance and banking; professional services, including legal services and private 
                                                 
28 World Trade Online, March 5, 2012. 
29 For more information, see CRS Report R42772, U.S. Textile Manufacturing and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Negotiations, by Michaela D. Platzer. 
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educational services; telecommunication services; express delivery; e-commerce and data flows 
(see e-commerce section below). In doing so, the United States has sought to expand on modest 
commitments that trade partners have made in the World Trade Organization (WTO) under the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), especially in light of the perceived failure of 
WTO partners to expand on those commitments in the now dormant Doha Round. 
U.S. FTAs with TPP partners Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore already 
cover trade in services. Although these countries cover more than half of U.S.-TPP services trade, 
Japan is also a major U.S.-services trade partner, so its entry has increased the significance of 
these provisions. Moreover, innovations regarding trade in services is a key part of the Obama 
Administration’s vision of the TPP as a “21st -century model” for trade agreements, and the 
United States seeks TPP services provisions to be as broad as possible to cover trade with future 
entrants. 
Restrictions in services trade, like nontariff barriers on goods trade, can take many different 
forms, making them difficult to quantify and compare across countries. The OECD has created 
indices that can provide some measure of services trade restrictiveness.30 These indices, available 
for OECD countries across 18 different services sectors, suggest that there is considerable 
variation in services trade restrictiveness among TPP OECD countries (Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and the United States) and hence opportunity for liberalization 
through TPP negotiation efforts. For example, in telecommunications, the index, which takes a 
value from 0 to 1 with a higher number indicating greater restrictiveness, ranging from 0.12 for 
the United States to 0.30 for Japan and 0.34 for Mexico. Such restrictions are likely even greater 
among some of the least developed TPP countries not included in the OECD database. Similar 
work by researchers at the World Bank, which covers more countries at less detail, supports this 
hypothesis. Their index for overall services trade restrictiveness, which takes a value from 0 to 
100, ranges from 11 for New Zealand to 41.5 for Vietnam and 46.1 for Malaysia, although Peru 
(16.4) scores even lower than the United States (17.7).31 
According to the agreed outline, the TPP will cover services trade in several separate chapters, 
with some overlap. The section on cross-border trade in services—in which the buyer and seller 
are located in different territories—will employ the “negative list approach” (as did the P-4 
agreement), that is, the provisions are to apply to all types of services unless specifically excluded 
by a partner country in an annex to the agreement. This approach is generally considered to be 
more comprehensive than the “positive list approach” used in the WTO General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) that requires each covered service to be identified. The negative 
approach also implies that any new type of service that is developed after the agreement enters 
into force is automatically covered unless it is specifically excluded. 
Most trade agreements on cross-border services trade, including U.S. FTAs and the original P-4 
agreement, contain basic provisions on services that will likely be part of the TPP:  
• nondiscriminatory treatment of services from partner-country providers, 
including national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment;  
                                                 
30 OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index available at http://www.oecd.org/tad/services-trade/services-trade-
restrictiveness-index.htm. 
31 Ingo Borchert, Batshur Gootiiz, and Aaditya Mattoo, Policy Barriers to International Trade in Services: New 
Empirical Evidence, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (WPS6109), 2012, http://iresearch.worldbank.org/
servicetrade/home.htm. 
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• market access—no limitations on the number of service suppliers, the total value 
or volume of services provided, the number of persons employed, or the types of 
legal entities or joint ventures that a foreign service supplier may employ;  
• prohibition on requirements that a partner-based service provider maintain a 
commercial presence in the country of the buyer; 
• mutual recognition of professional qualifications for certification of service 
providers; 
• transparency in the development and application of government regulations; and 
• allowance for payments and transfers of capital flows in the provision of 
services.  
In recent FTAs, including KORUS FTA, the United States has made market access of express 
delivery services a priority, which could also be the case in its negotiations on the TPP. Of 
particular concern are cases where a government-owned and operated postal system provides 
express delivery services competing with private sector providers. The KORUS FTA (Annex-12-
B) stipulates that the postal system cannot use its monopoly power in providing postal services to 
give an express delivery subsidiary an unfair advantage. Nor should it divert revenues from its 
postal services to subsidize its express delivery services to the disadvantage of other providers.  
In addition, other chapters in the proposed agreement would affect trade in services because of 
the nature of services and their modes of delivery. Most services require the provider and buyer to 
be co-located, and the largest volume of services trade occurs when the provider has a 
commercial presence in the form of a direct investment in the country of the buyer and sells the 
service to the buyer. Therefore, provisions of the TPP that may pertain to foreign investments 
(discussed elsewhere) relate to trade in services. In addition, many service providers, such as 
sellers of entertainment programming, are intellectual property owners and argue for strong IP 
rights protection, the subject of another chapter in the proposed TPP (and discussed elsewhere). 
Often, businesses rely on cross-border transmission of data and the ability to transfer that data 
with a minimum of restrictions is also being considered elsewhere in the agreement. Furthermore, 
most of the barriers to trade in services are in the form of domestic regulations; therefore, the 
cross-cutting objective for regulatory coherence could affect trade in services.  
According to the November 2011 outline, as in previous U.S. FTAs, the TPP will have a separate 
chapter on telecommunications trade. The TPP is to promote access to telecommunications 
networks for foreign services suppliers and transparency of regulations pertaining to 
telecommunications services. Along with these objectives, the United States sought and obtained 
in the KORUS FTA commitments to allow U.S. investment in foreign telecommunications 
companies.  
Negotiations over the services provisions may lead to controversy between the developed 
countries, including the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore, 
and developing countries. Developed countries have pushed for greater market access for 
services. Developing countries have been more cautious on liberalization in services trade as they 
fear competition in sectors they view as a source of domestic employment and worry about the 
political implications of forcing open sectors that are often controlled by politically powerful 
interests. Also, the United States may be challenged to open its market to providers of maritime 
services. The United States has also been pressed to liberalize access to its market through the so-
called GATS mode-4 delivery—temporary entry of business personnel to provide services. No 
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U.S. FTA negotiated after the agreements with Chile and Singapore agreements includes 
provisions on the temporary movement of personnel. 
Financial Services 
The draft TPP outline indicates that financial services, including insurance and insurance-related 
services, banking and related services, as well as auxiliary services of a financial nature, will be 
addressed in a separate chapter as in previous FTAs. The original P-4 agreement did not include 
financial services provisions when it came into force in 2006. However, the P-4 partners 
committed to concluding a financial services (and investment) chapter within two years—a 
commitment that was overtaken by the launch of the TPP. The financial services chapter would 
adapt relevant provisions from the foreign investment chapter and the cross-border trade in 
services chapter. The KORUS FTA was the most recent U.S. FTA in which the United States 
negotiated provisions on financial services and which presumably will serve as a model for U.S. 
negotiations of the TPP in this area. The KORUS FTA distinguishes between financial services 
traded across borders and those sold by a provider with a commercial presence in the home 
country of the buyer. In the case of providers with a foreign commercial presence, the KORUS 
FTA applies the negative list approach; in the case of cross-border trade, the KORUS FTA limits 
coverage to specific banking and insurance services.32  
The KORUS FTA and other U.S. FTAs provide that nothing in the FTA would prevent a party to 
the agreement from imposing prudential measures to ensure the integrity and stability of the 
financial system. The KORUS FTA also addresses insurance sold by Korea Post, in particular that 
Korea Post is not regulated as other financial institutions. U.S. providers have argued that 
government-owned and operated insurance providers are not regulated as stringently and 
therefore, have a competitive advantage over their privately owned counterparts. The KORUS 
FTA stipulates Korea Post insurance operations would be subject to tighter regulation. Another 
issue of U.S. concern regarding financial services was assurances that a U.S. financial service 
provider located in South Korea would be able to transfer information electronically or by other 
means from the host country where it is required in the ordinary course of business. Such 
information could include accounting information and human resources information that a 
company would want to transfer and process to a central location rather than having to process 
and keep at individual locations. Host governments are cautious that such transfers of information 
might violate domestic privacy laws and considerations.  
Government Procurement 
The United States is a member of the plurilateral WTO Government Procurement Agreement 
(GPA) and has sought the inclusion of government procurement provisions in its FTAs. Among 
TPP partner countries, only Japan, Singapore, and New Zealand are members of the GPA, with 
New Zealand becoming a member in late 2014. In previous FTA negotiations with Malaysia, the 
United States had sought concessions on government procurement, a sensitive area for Malaysia 
which since 1969 has maintained preferences designed to assist the ethnic Malay population. All 
                                                 
32 Regarding insurance, the FTA’s coverage would be limited to cross-border trade in marine, aviation, and transit 
insurance; reinsurance; services auxiliary to insurance, such as consultancy, risk assessment, and actuarial and claim 
settlement services; and insurance intermediation services such as brokerage and agency services. Regarding banking 
and securities, the agreement’s coverage in cross-border trade would be limited to providing financial information and 
data processing, advisory, and other auxiliary financial services.  
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U.S. FTAs—including those with TPP partners Australia, Peru, Chile, Singapore, and NAFTA—
include chapters on government procurement. Nearly identical to U.S. obligations in the GPA, 
although with different schedules of commitments for various government agencies, the FTA 
obligations provide opportunities for firms of each nation to bid on certain federal and state 
contracts over a set monetary threshold on a reciprocal basis. A similar chapter has been proposed 
by U.S. negotiators in the TPP talks.  
On July 30, 2014, 123 Members of Congress wrote to President Obama to urge the 
Administration not to negotiate government procurement provisions that would limit the 
application of Buy American provisions through extension of government procurement 
opportunities and obligations to TPP partner countries.33 Supporters of expanded procurement 
opportunities argue that the reciprocal nature of the government procurement provisions will 
allow U.S. firms access to major government procurement market opportunities overseas. This 
market potentially could be quite large. According to the WTO, government procurement 
accounts for 15%-20% of a country’s GDP, and the size of the government procurement market 
among GPA members was $1.6 trillion in 2008.34  
The United States has indicated that it is not seeking to cover state or local procurement in the 
TPP negotiations. This may be due to resistance among some U.S. states in providing access to 
their procurement markets. States must voluntarily opt in to government procurement 
commitments in FTAs, but the number of states doing so has dropped substantially from the 37 
states that signed up to the GPA to 10 states that have acceded to commitments under the most 
recent U.S. bilateral FTAs with South Korea, Panama, and Colombia. However, Canada 
reportedly is seeking to address remaining U.S. Buy American exclusions concerning state and 
municipal projects funded by the federal government by proposing to obligate sub-federal entities 
to open procurement projects funded by a central government to competition from firms in TPP 
countries.35 
Agriculture 
Negotiating the terms of agricultural trade liberalization within the context of what trade 
negotiators have billed as a high-standard trade agreement for the 21st century continues to be 
central to efforts to fashion an overall TPP agreement. Within this process, bilateral negotiations 
between the United States and Japan that seek to come to terms on market access for a handful of 
key agricultural commodities that Japan considers to be sensitive and in need of continued import 
protection has become an important objective for U.S. agricultural interests.. While other 
agricultural issues remain on the table (discussed below), the market access issues with Japan 
appear to be a crucial stepping stone for substantially concluding the agricultural dimension of an 
agreement which, in turn, could help to clear the pathway for moving the broader TPP 
negotiations toward an end point.  
                                                 
33 Letter available at http://donnaedwards.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=657:edwards-
delauro-lead-121-members-of-congress-to-urge-president-obama-to-protect-buy-american-policies-in-tpp&catid=
10:press-releases&Itemid=18. 
34 Briefing Note: Government Procurement Agreement, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min11_e/
brief_gpa_e.htm. 
35 “Canada to Push Opening U.S. Government Procurement Contracts at TPP, Source, Wall Street Journal, February 
21, 2013. 
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Market Access 
U.S. agriculture has both offensive and defensive interests in the TPP negotiations. Many in the 
U.S. agriculture and the agribusiness/food manufacturing sectors view positively the prospect of 
market openings in the three most commercially significant countries with which the United 
States does not yet have an FTA (i.e., Japan, Malaysia, and Vietnam). On the defensive side of the 
ledger, the U.S. sugar industry is opposed to providing additional access to the U.S. sugar market, 
while the U.S. dairy industry has offensive and defensive interest that extend beyond tariffs and 
market access. 
In negotiating expanded market access, the TPP countries have engaged in a process where offers 
are exchanged with each other and then responded to with requests to improve the offer. To date, 
USTR has engaged in a separate offer/request process with each of the five countries that the 
United States does not yet have a bilateral FTA—Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, and 
Vietnam. Whether this process has been undertaken with Canada is unclear. A major issue for 
U.S. agricultural interests is that Canada maintains support regimes for several significant 
commodity groups, including dairy, poultry and eggs. These regimes support domestic prices and 
discourage imports, with the result that access to these product markets has not been fully 
liberalized under the Canada-U.S. FTA. With respect to other countries with which the United 
States has an FTA, the U.S. position is that it will not engage in talks to reopen any existing 
market access provision. 
U.S.-Japan Negotiations a Bellwether 
Japan—currently the fourth largest market for U.S. agricultural exports—is generally considered 
to be the most promising market within the TPP group for U.S. agriculture. In an analysis issued 
in October 2014, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) modeled a TPP agreement in which 
tariffs and tariff rate quotas on agricultural products were eliminated. The model projected that 
Japan would absorb 70% of the $8.5 billion increase in agricultural trade among TPP countries in 
2025, with U.S. agricultural interests capturing one-third of the increase in farm exports within 
the TPP. It follows that for U.S. agriculture to realizing this potential market expansion depends 
greatly upon the extent to which Japan agrees to reduce the high tariffs and restrictive quotas that 
surround its most sensitive commodities. These measures protect Japanese producers of pork, 
beef, rice, wheat, barley, dairy products, and sugar by discouraging imports.  
The offers that Japan has tabled with respect to relaxing access to its market for these sensitive 
commodities have not been made public. During the last half of 2014 numerous Members of 
Congress and some commodity groups expressed concern about whether Japan’s concession 
offers to cut tariff rates and remove other restrictions on imported products, were ambitious 
enough to gain congressional support for an agreement. For instance, on July 30, 2014, 140 
House Members signed a letter to President Obama expressing “deep concern over Japan’s 
current market access offer” in the TPP negotiations.36 The letter characterizes Japan’s effort to 
exempt numerous tariff lines from complete elimination as “objectionable,” adding that it “falls 
far short of acceptability.” Similarly, in early September 2014 the National Pork Producers 
Council (NPPC), along with trade organizations representing hog producers in Australia, Chile, 
and Mexico issued an open letter to TPP negotiators which referenced Japanese restrictions on 
trade in pork and called for an agreement “in which full tariff elimination is achieved for virtually 
                                                 
36 See http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/tpp_market_access_letter.pdf. 
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all products, including pork.”37 The letter cites “Reports that Japan has made unacceptable tariff 
offers in each of the agricultural sectors it considers sensitive, including pork.”  
More recently though, there have been unofficial indications that Japan has sweetened its access 
offers on its most sensitive commodities, though definitive details have not been made public. 
Japanese press reports have suggested the Japanese government has improved its market access 
offers to the United States on pork, beef, and rice, suggesting that a narrowing of differences over 
these sensitive items may be in the works. In late January 2015, the NPPC cited “significant 
progress” on Japan’s market access offer on pork.38 In his testimony of March 18, 2015 before the 
House Committee on Agriculture, American Farm Bureau Federation President Bob Stallman 
stated “Indications are that there will be a reduction in Japan’s beef tariffs, reform of their 
gateway price system for pork, additional TRQ for rice and reduction in tariffs on dairy 
products.”39 
Access Issues Extend Beyond Japan  
In an indication that concern about expanding market access for U.S. agricultural products in a 
TPP agreement is not limited to Japan alone, signatories to the House letter of July 30, 2014 (see 
above) added that they are “troubled by Canada’s lack of ambition, which is threatening a robust 
outcome for U.S. farmers.” The reference appeared to be aimed at the import protections Canada 
maintains to shield its poultry, egg, and dairy industries from foreign products, which it believes 
could undermine the supply management regimes that support prices for these commodities. To 
underscore the point, the House letter urges the President to pursue TPP negotiations without 
Japan, Canada or any other country that fails to open its markets in line with the high standards 
envisaged for the TPP.  
The market access issue with Canada is one that would be expected to move to the forefront of 
negotiations once the agricultural market access negotiations between the United States and Japan 
have been settled. An agreement with Japan that provides for substantially improved access to 
Japanese markets for its sensitive commodities would likely create strong pressure to achieve a 
similar outcome with Canada. Under such circumstances Canada might, in turn, seek greater 
access to U.S. markets for selected commodities, such as sugar, sugar-containing products, 
peanuts, and dairy products among others. 
The number of agricultural market access issues that remain to be resolved and the length of time 
this may require are open questions. During House and Senate trade policy hearings in January 
2015, Members in both Chambers noted that several issues remain unresolved in the TPP 
negotiations.40 In his January 2015 report, House Ways and Means Committee Ranking Member 
Levin, provided additional detail and identified numerous outstanding issues in the TPP 
                                                 
37 See “Top Pork Producers Want Tariffs Eliminated in TPP”, September 8, 2014, at http://www.nppc.org/2014/09/top-
pork-countries-want-tariffs-eliminated-in-tpp/. 
38 See “U.S. Pork Producers All In on TPA”, January 26, 2015, at http://www.nppc.org/2015/01/u-s-pork-producers-all-
in-on-tpa/. 
39 Testimony of American Farm Bureau Federation of March 18, 2015 to House Committee on Agriculture at 
http://agriculture.house.gov/sites/republicans.agriculture.house.gov/files/images/Stallman%20Testimony.pdf. 
40 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. Trade Policy Agenda, 114th Cong., 1st sess., January 27, 
2015; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, President Obama’s 2015 Trade Policy Agenda, 114th Cong., 1st 
sess., January 27, 2015. 
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negotiations, among which he cited the need to gain greater access for U.S. agricultural products 
to markets in Japan and Canada.41  
U.S. Sugar and Dairy Interests and the TPP 
Dairy and sugar are among the most significant of the sensitive U.S. agricultural commodities. 
Although U.S. agricultural groups generally have pressed for the complete elimination of all 
tariffs and other restrictions on market access for agricultural products imported by other TPP 
countries, not all food and commodity groups support this approach.  
At this point in the negotiations, the U.S. dairy industry, as represented by the National Milk 
Producers Federation (NMPF) and the U.S. Dairy Export Council (USDEC), are pressing for 
greater access to certain dairy product markets within the TPP, particularly Canada and Japan.In a 
joint letter to Members of Congress on March 2, 2015, the NMPF and USDEC emphasized the 
importance of striking a TPP agreement that expands access to these markets for the U.S. dairy 
industry, stating: “Our goal is an agreement that on balance offers net trade benefits to the U.S. 
industry. To get there, market access into the region’s most protected dairy markets—Japan and 
Canada is imperative.” The letter continues, “However, Japan needs to do more; in particular it 
needs to provide avenues for U.S. export growth in all areas.” The two dairy organizations made a 
pointed reference to Canada, asserting, “Likewise, Canada has yet to put forward an offer on 
dairy. In order for TPP to be successful and truly comprehensive, it is imperative that Canada 
provide significant market opening for the full range of U.S. dairy products.”42 
In a subsequent letter of March 19, 2015 that was addressed to Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack 
and U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman, along with their counterparts in Australia and 
New Zealand, the NMPF, USDEC, the International Dairy Foods Association, together with dairy 
industry organizations in Australia and New Zealand, struck a similar theme. In this letter, the 
dairy groups highlighted the importance of achieving increased market access in Japan and 
Canada, and asserted that more progress is needed on that front. Thus the letter states, “While 
negotiations with Japan have made progress, vital work remains.” The letter adds, “In addition, 
Canada now needs a great deal more focus and we urge the immediate commencement of focused 
dairy market access negotiations with Canada. It is imperative that Canada provide commercially 
meaningful market openings for all dairy products if it is to remain a participant in the treaty.”43 
The U.S. sugar production sector, as represented by the American Sugar Alliance, has opposed 
opening the U.S. sugar market to any additional imports from the TPP region. But the Sweetener 
Users Association, representing candy makers and other sugar-consuming industries, have argued 
that any TPP agreement should provide for immediate, new access to the U.S. market for foreign 
sugar, while also establishing a glide path to trade liberalization for all sugar-producing TPP 
partners. They argue the increased competition would benefit both sugar-consuming businesses 
                                                 
41 See, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership: A Path Forward to an Effective Engagement,” January 22, 2015, at 
http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/A%20Path%20F
orward%20to%20an%20Effective%20TPP%20Agreement%201.pdf. 
42 Letter of March 2, 2015 to Members of Congress from the U.S. Dairy Export Council and National Milk Producers 
Federation at http://www.nmpf.org/files/file/Kappelman_Testimony_for_NMPF_House_Ag_031815.pdf. 
43 Letter of March 19, 2015 from U.S., Australian and New Zealand agriculture and trade officials at 
http://www.nmpf.org/files/file/TPP-Dairy-Letter-Japan-Canada-Market-Access-031915.pdf. 
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and consumers. To this end, it remains to be seen whether Australia, a major sugar producer, will 
use the TPP negotiations to press for access to the U.S. sugar market, perhaps in return for 
engaging in priority issues for the United States, such as e-commerce, investor-state dispute 
settlement, and state-owned enterprises.  
Agricultural Issues in Other TPP Chapters 
In the rules portion of the TPP, negotiators are seeking to better address disputes that can arise 
over differences on how to handle human health and animal/plant safety issues (i.e., sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards (SPS)) associated with trade in agricultural products, and the possible 
ramifications of regulating the sale of some tobacco products on trade in tobacco. The 
“Intellectual Property Rights” chapter could include provisions to prescribe how agricultural 
products with a “geographical indication” designation are to be treated. The “Competition” 
chapter could address objectives sought by Australia and New Zealand to secure disciplines on 
TPP countries’ use of export subsidies, export credits, and food aid to promote their farm sectors.  
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards 
As part of the effort to make the TPP a 21st-century agreement, while boosting U.S. agricultural 
exports beyond what U.S. negotiators might secure in market access talks alone, negotiators are 
drafting a chapter on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) matters that lays out commitments relating 
to human health and animal/plant safety which would go beyond those found in the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) SPS Agreement.44  
An important issue that has been a source of controversy concerns what approach should be 
included to resolve SPS disagreements that arise among TPP members. USTR has tabled text that 
would establish both a “consultative mechanism” among technical experts to address SPS 
disputes that arise, and a “rapid-response mechanism” designed to quickly resolve SPS barriers 
that block shipments of perishable products. Other TPP countries that are significant agricultural 
exporters appear to favor a dispute settlement process for SPS obligations.45 At the Ottawa round 
in July 2014, USTR reportedly indicated it would accept dispute settlement for some SPS 
obligations, but not for all. Unclear was what type of dispute settlement mechanism would be 
acceptable and which SPS obligations the United States would agree to subject to this 
procedure.46  
U.S. agricultural interests and food groups have supported the inclusion of an enforcement 
mechanism for SPS disputes in the TPP text. In testimony before the House Committee on 
Agriculture on March 18, 2015, the United Fresh Produce Association cited the increasing use of 
nontariff barriers as an obstacle to U.S. fruit and vegetable exports and advocated for “the 
creation of a dispute settlement process that resolves nontariff trade issues in a timely manner.”47 
                                                 
44 For background on SPS issues see CRS Report R43450, Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and Related Non-Tariff 
Barriers to Agricultural Trade, by Renée Johnson. 
45 “New U.S. SPS Text Includes Consultative Mechanism, RRM Provisions,” Inside U.S. Trade, May 24, 2013; “Food, 
Agriculture Groups Blast U.S. Approach to SPS Disputes in TPP,” Inside U.S. Trade, May 10, 2013. 
46 “TPP Chief Negotiators Narrow Differences on Handling of SPS Disputes”, Inside U.S. Trade, July 10, 2014. 
47 Testimony of the United Fresh Produce Association before the House Committee on Agriculture of March 18, 2015 
at http://www.unitedfresh.org/content/uploads/2014/07/House-ag-comte-trade-hearing-3-18-15-guenther-
testimony.pdf. 
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A letter from 24 Members of Congress on SPS disputes, dated August 3, 2012, called for the 
inclusion of “effective and enforceable rules” to strengthen the role of science in resolving 
differences.48 A different perspective on SPS enforcement is expressed in Representative Levin’s 
report to the Council on Foreign Relations in September 2014. In that report, Representative 
Levin cautioned that any new SPS disciplines under TPP must not place U.S. regulatory 
sovereignty at risk in view of the broad array of conditions that exist across TPP countries.49 
Tobacco 
On the matter of controlling tobacco use, the U.S. position as articulated by USTR has drawn 
criticism from a number of quarters for being inadequate to protect public health, while others 
have argued that tobacco products are uniquely harmful and should be excluded from trade 
liberalization altogether. USTR’s August 2013 proposal for tobacco products clarifies that TTP 
countries agree that exceptions allowed under the two multilateral trade agreements (i.e., Article 
XX(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Article XVI of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)), which allow for measures that are necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health, would not violate the agreements if the measure is not a 
disguised trade barrier. The proposal would require a TPP signatory to consult with its TPP 
partners before bringing a legal challenge under any tobacco control measures agreed upon in a 
TPP text.50 Malaysia has countered with a proposal that would exempt tobacco-control measures 
from being challenged under TPP.  
USTR’s proposal has been criticized by some Members of Congress, by a number of tobacco 
control groups, and by attorneys general from 45 states and territories. In a letter to President 
Obama of October 30, 2013, 56 Members of the House asserted that USTR’s August 2013 
proposal would likely lead to greater use of tobacco products in developing countries.51 A 
November 12, 2013 letter from 12 Senators to USTR Ambassador Michael Froman expressed 
concern that USTR’s TPP proposal could allow tobacco companies to use trade law to undermine 
domestic tobacco control measures, and advocated excluding tobacco products from TPP.52 Five 
U.S. tobacco control groups lamented that USTR retreated from its earlier proposal that would 
have made it more difficult for tobacco companies to challenge domestic tobacco control 
measures under trade agreements. They noted that USTR’s August 2013 proposal fails to 
recognize tobacco as a “uniquely harmful product,” while also pointing out that it would not 
cover lawsuits filed by tobacco firms, and would not provide countries that have strong control 
                                                 
48 Letter to USTR Ron Kirk from Members of the House Agriculture and Ways and Means Committees, August 3, 
2012; “TPP’s Biggest Benefit for Agriculture is Binding SPS Rules, Stallman Says,” Inside U.S. Trade, November 16, 
2012. 
49 See A Report to the Council on Foreign Relations by Congressman Sander Levin at 
http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/
Levin%20Report%20to%20CFR%20on%20TPP.pdf. 
50 “USTR Prepares To Table Revised TPP Tobacco Proposal, Briefs Congress,” Inside U.S. Trade, August 16, 2013; 
USTR, “Fact Sheet: New U.S. Proposal on Tobacco Regulation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” August 21, 2013, 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2013/august/fact-sheet-tobacco-and-tpp. 
51 “Reps. Waxman, Doggett, Capps, and over 50 Members Urge Administration to Strengthen Tobacco Proposal for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement”, October 30, 2013, at http://waxman.house.gov/press-release/reps-waxman-
doggett-capps-and-over-50-members-urge-administration-strengthen-tobacco. 
52 “Blumenthal, Murphy Urge USTR to Safeguard Tobacco Control Measures and Protect Public Health in Trade 
Agreement”, November 14, 2013, at http://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/blumenthal-murphy-
urge-ustr-to-safeguard-tobacco-control-measures-and-protect-public-health-in-trade-agreement. 
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measures with the protections needed to rebuff challenges by the industry.53 The 45 attorneys 
general issued a letter to USTR in January 2014, expressing concern that TPP could pose a threat 
to state and local regulation of tobacco products, and urging USTR to exclude tobacco products 
from TPP.54  
At the same time, a number of U.S. business associations and food and agriculture organizations 
have taken a stand against any effort to exclude tobacco product manufacturers from investor-
state dispute settlement provisions in a TPP agreement. In a letter of October 21, 2014, to Japan’s 
ambassador to the United States, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of 
Manufacturers, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the American Meat Institute, and others, 
asserted that excluding any sector from the basic rules of investment agreements would 
undermine the investment trade and rules-based system, and would carry with it a number of 
negative consequences.55 Senator Mitch McConnell has expressed to USTR Michael Froman his 
concern over any effort to exclude tobacco products from investor-state dispute settlement 
provisions within TPP.56  
Geographical Indications 
Another agricultural trade issue that has surfaced in the TPP negotiations concerns the use of 
geographical indications (GIs). GIs apply primarily to agricultural products, including cheese, 
wines, and spirits. Examples of GIs are Roquefort cheese, Idaho potatoes, Champagne, and 
Tuscan olive oil.57 The WTO’s intellectual property rights agreement and related provisions in the 
FTAs negotiated by the United States recognize the use of geographical indications to protect the 
quality and reputation of a distinctive product produced in a particular region of a country. The 
U.S. dairy industry, though, is concerned that GI protections which the European Union (EU) has 
accorded to cheese names that U.S. manufacturers consider to be common names, such as 
parmesan and asiago, could impede their access to export markets.  
The U.S. dairy industry wants safeguards included in TPP to ensure that exports of cheeses using 
common food names, like parmesan, feta and romano, will not be blocked as a result of bilateral 
FTAs that TPP member states negotiate with the EU.58 This arises from the GI provision in the 
EU-South Korea FTA (KOREU), and in the EU-Canada FTA which is pending ratification. The 
U.S. dairy industry argues the GI provisions in these agreements have, and will, limit U.S. 
exports to these markets.59 An open question is how the TPP will treat this matter for countries 
                                                 
53 Statement of Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network, American Heart 
Association, American Lung Association and American Academy of Pediatrics, “USTR Abandons Plan to Protect 
Tobacco Control Measures under Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement,” August 19, 2013, 
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/press_releases/post/2013_08_19_trade. 
54 “U.S. Trade Agreement Should Not Apply to Tobacco”, January 27, 2014, at http://www.naag.org/u.s.-trade-
agreements-should-not-apply-to-tobacco1.php. 
55 Letter Ambassador Kenichiro Sasae of Japan, October 21, 2014, at https://www.politicopro.com/images/pdf/
letter_to_ambassador_kenichiro_sasae.pdf. 
56 The Hill, “McConnell seeks to protect tobacco industry in trade deal,” October 19, 2014, at http://thehill.com/policy/
finance/221197-mcconnell-seeks-to-protect-tobacco-industry-in-trade-deal. 
57 For more information on GIs, see CRS In Focus, Geographic Indications in the U.S.-EU Trade Negotiations, by 
Renée Johnson. 
58 For more on the U.S. dairy industry position on the TPP see http://usdec.files.cms-plus.com/PDFs/TradePolicy/
Dairy%20TPP%20Backgrounder_0713.pdf. 
59 For more detail see testimony of the U.S. Dairy Export Council & National Milk Producers Federation to the U.S. 
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that have an existing FTA with the EU that provides for recognition of such GI-restricted 
products. In their joint letter of March 2, 2015 to Members of Congress, NMPF and USDEC 
called for addressing the GI issue within TPP through “improving safeguards surrounding the use 
of common food names” in response to what it called “the EU’s abuse of geographical indications 
to erect barriers to U.S. exports.”60 
Agricultural Competition 
One of Australia’s TPP negotiating objectives, supported by New Zealand, has been to secure 
disciplines on other TPP countries’ use of export subsidies, official export credits, and food aid in 
support of their agricultural sectors. Its negotiators have argued for years in the multilateral Doha 
Round that these programmatic tools distort agricultural trade and should be modified when 
negotiating trade agreements in order to minimize such impacts. The United States has eliminated 
the use of export subsidies for agricultural products and, in recent years, has significantly 
reformed its use of export credit guarantees. However, the United States has signaled its 
opposition to any effort to include food aid disciplines in the TPP, contending that such rules 
should be developed on a multilateral basis.61  
Some observers have suggested that Australia’s insistence on the inclusion of issues relating to 
agricultural export competition is part of a strategy to engineer a compromise which would 
include the United States addressing Australia’s other priorities, such as obtaining additional 
access to the U.S. market for Australia’s sugar and dairy products, and securing an exclusion for 
Australia from TPP’s final investor-state dispute settlement mechanism.62 
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July 29, 2014, at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Testimony%20to%20Senate%20Trade%20Subcommittee%20on%20Korus_July%2029%2014_FINAL.pdf. 
60 Letter of March 2, 2015 to Members of Congress from the U.S. Dairy Export Council and National Milk Producers 
Federation at http://www.nmpf.org/files/file/Kappelman_Testimony_for_NMPF_House_Ag_031815.pdf. 
 
61 “USTR Says It Will Oppose Inclusion of Food Aid Disciplines In TPP Talks,” Inside U.S. Trade, December 7, 2012, 
pp. 10-11. 
62 Inside U.S. Trade, “Australian Opposition on Key U.S. Priorities Emerges as Hurdle in TPP,” September 21, 2012. 
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“The May 10th Agreement”
On May 10, 2007, a bipartisan group of congressional leaders and the Bush Administration released a statement on 
agreed principles in four policy areas: worker rights, environment protection, intellectual property rights, and foreign 
investment. The principles were to be reflected in provisions in four U.S. FTAs—with Colombia, Panama, Peru, and 
South Korea. Regarding worker rights, the May 10th Agreement (the Agreement) required the United States and FTA 
partners to commit to enforcing the five international labor principles enshrined in International Labour 
Organization’s (ILO’s) 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights At Work and that the commitment be 
enforceable under the FTA. These rights are the freedom of association, the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining, the elimination of all forms of compulsory or forced labor, the effective abolition of child labor, 
and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
The Agreement also required FTAs to adhere to seven major multilateral environmental agreements: The seven 
agreements are the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species; the Montreal Protocol on Ozone 
Depleting Substances; the Convention on Marine Pollution; the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention; the 
Ramsar Convention on the Wetlands; the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling; and the 
Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. 
Furthermore, the parties are not to waive or otherwise derogate from their labor or environmental protection laws 
in a manner that would affect trade or investment with the FTA partner(s). In addition, the labor and environment 
provisions must be enforceable, if consultation and other avenues fail, through the same dispute settlement 
procedures that apply to the other provisions in the FTA.  
The Agreement also required the FTAs to include provisions related to patents and approval of pharmaceuticals for 
marketing exclusivity with different requirements for developed and developing countries. Specifically, the Agreement 
requires provisions dealing with the effective period of data exclusivity—the restrictions on the use of test data 
produced for market approval by generic drug producers; patent extensions; linkage of marketing approval of generic 
drugs to determination of possible patent infringement; and reaffirmation of adherence to Doha Declaration on 
compulsory licensing of drugs to respond to public health crises. 
Regarding foreign investment, the Agreement required each of the FTAs to state that none of its provisions would 
accord foreign investors greater substantive rights in terms of foreign investment protection than are accorded U.S. 
investors in the United States.  
Core Negotiating Issues: Rules 
In addition to market access, the TPP contains several provisions that build upon rules and 
disciplines contained in the World Trade Organization’s Uruguay Round agreements. Many of 
these provisions have become part of the standard template for U.S. FTAs. While all countries 
likely would eventually have to adhere to all of the obligations of the agreement, TPP participants 
may be open to allowing developing countries in the TPP to have longer phase-in periods for 
rules-based commitments. 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
The United States has sought increased intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in its FTAs. 
IPR negotiating objectives in the last U.S. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) (P.L. 107-210) in 
effect between 2002 and 2007 included, among others: (1) the application of existing IPR 
protection to digital media; and (2) negotiation of trade agreements in terms of IPR that “reflect a 
standard of protection similar to that found in U.S. law.” This phrase opened the door to the 
negotiation of provisions that go beyond the level of protection provided in the WTO Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, including with the current 
TPP negotiations. For example, the United States has sought to have its partner countries sign the 
World Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO’s) Performances and Phonograms Treaty, an 
agreement to which Brunei, New Zealand, and Vietnam are not parties. These provisions from the 
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last TPA are included in the objectives in the Baucus/Hatch/Camp 2014 TPA proposal (H.R. 
3830/S. 1900).63 
Copyright 
The United States traditionally has favored strong copyright provisions in its FTAs, of importance 
to industries such as books, movies, and music that rely on IPR. In some areas, notably the 
relationship between copyright and the Internet, different domestic constituencies have sought to 
influence the U.S. negotiating position. Some copyright provisions that the United States has 
sought in its recent FTAs include 
• extending the copyright term to no less than 70 years from death of the 
author or authorized publication from no less than 50 years currently. For 
works not attributed to an author the term would be 95 years; 
• prohibiting the removal or alteration of digital rights management; 
• prohibiting the circumvention of copyrighted work; 
• providing limited liability for Internet service providers (ISP) for certain 
copyright infringement (see below). 
U.S. stakeholders have held divergent views relating to copyright enforcement and the Internet, 
with views differing especially between ISPs and traditional content providers. Internet providers 
and other activists are seeking to provide a more explicit balance in the agreement text between 
the rights of content providers and users of copyright material, while content providers have 
favored strong ISP liability provisions for effective copyright enforcement. The United States 
reportedly proposed language to place certain limitations on copyrights consistent with the so-
called “three-step test”: that the exception (1) is consistent with domestic copyright law; (2) does 
not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work; and (3) does not unreasonably prejudice the 
interest of the rights holder. The proposal also reportedly obligates each country to provide for 
such exceptions in their domestic copyright laws.64 
The United States reportedly favors criminal penalties for “willful” trademark infringement, 
counterfeiting, and copyright piracy on a “commercial scale.” Commercial scale includes acts that 
result in no direct or financial gain, such as file sharing. It would also require criminal penalties 
for importing counterfeit labeling and packaging whether done willfully or not, and it would 
require criminal penalties for cam-cording in movie theatres.  
Some countries, notably Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore, reportedly have sought to 
replace U.S. text on criminal enforcement with that of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA).65 Although both ACTA and the U.S. proposal for the TPP, which largely track the IPR 
provisions in the U.S.-Korea FTA, provide stricter criminal enforcement measures than the WTO 
TRIPS Agreement, ACTA provides greater flexibility than what is reportedly contained in U.S. 
proposals regarding a country’s enforcement of IPR. For example, in ACTA, financial gain is 
                                                 
63 See text box, above Trade Promotion Authority.  
64 “U.S. Tables New Proposal in TPP Outlining Broad Copyright Exceptions,” Inside U.S. Trade, July 6, 2012. 
65 “Countries Offer ACTA Language to Replace U.S. IPR Proposal,” Inside U.S. Trade, May 14, 2012; for more 
information on ACTA, see CRS Report R41107, The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Background and 
Key Issues, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar. 
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necessary to be considered commercial scale for prosecution, and willfulness is required for 
importation of trademark infringing goods. 
Patents 
The scope of patentability has become an issue in the IPR negotiations. U.S. FTAs generally have 
followed the TRIPS Agreement, which makes patents available “for any invention, whether 
product or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve and inventive 
step, and are capable of industrial application.” However, in the TPP negotiations, the United 
States reportedly has also sought the ability to patent: 
• plants and animals;  
• diagnostic, therapeutic, or surgical methods if they cover a method of using a 
machine, manufacture, or composition of material; and 
• new forms, uses or methods of an existing product without enhanced 
efficacy. 
These provisions did not appear in the U.S.-Korea FTA. Critics assert that the last point 
encourages the practice of “evergreening,” a practice whereby a manufacturer allegedly would 
make minor modifications to an existing product to extend its patent, thus delaying the 
introduction of generic equivalents. Manufacturers contend that new versions of their product 
represent more potent, longer-lasting formulations or improved delivery systems that make taking 
the drug easier or more convenient.66 
Access to Medicines 
The debate over patent provisions in the TPP also relate to pharmaceuticals and access to 
medicines, one of the more controversial provisions in U.S.-negotiated FTAs in recent years. The 
controversy revolves around whether to assert the more far-reaching IPR provisions of the 
KORUS FTA or to adopt the somewhat more flexible “May 10th Agreement” provisions found in 
the Colombia, Peru, and Panama FTAs.67 Based on published reports, it appears that U.S. 
negotiators are trying to develop an approach that would build on the May 10th Agreement, which 
sets different standards for developed countries (as found in the KORUS FTA) than developing 
countries (as in the Colombia, Panama, and Peru FTAs) for certain intellectual property 
provisions.68 
In late November 2013, USTR reportedly introduced a revised proposal that would attempt to 
balance the provision of certain patent protections with the ability of developing countries in the 
                                                 
66 “Evolving Patent Issues and the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” by Krista Cox, October 15, 2013, Knowledge Economy 
International http://keionline.org/node/1813; “U.S. TPP Proposal Broadens Patent Rights, But Secondary Liability 
Unclear,” Inside U.S. Trade, March 18, 2011.  
67 The May 10th provisions, which applied to the Colombia, Peru, and Panama FTAs, among other issues, relaxed IPR 
provisions on patent term extensions, patent linkages, and data exclusivity. For more information about these 
provisions, see CRS Report RL34292, Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar 
and Ian F. Fergusson.  
68 “U.S. Discussing Tailored Approach to IPR for Medicines in Trans-Pacific Partnership,” Bloomberg BNA, 
November 29, 2013;  
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TPP to access needed medicines.69 The new proposal tracks the intent of the May 10th provisions 
by reportedly providing options to developing countries in the TPP concerning certain patent 
protections, at least as long as they remained a developing country based on some agreed-upon 
benchmark. According to reports, the proposal would allow developing countries to follow the 
provisions of the U.S. Peru FTA, under which 
• patent term extensions, which allow for the extension of a patent term in 
cases of “unreasonable” delay in market approval, would be optional; 
• patent linkages—preventing regulators from extending market approval to a 
generic drug without determining that an existing patent would not be 
violated—would be optional provided a rights-holder would otherwise be 
able to defend the patent; and 
• data exclusivity, the prohibition of use by generics of clinical test data 
(usually supplied by the original patent holder), would be for five years after 
marketing approval for the patented product. However, the Peru FTA 
permitted the clock to start on the exclusivity period at the time of first-
country market approval if the second country approved the product within 
six months of the date of first market approval. 
Countries reportedly would be eligible for these provisions based on an economic indicator such 
as per capita gross national income (GNI) or product (GDP). If the World Bank benchmark of 
$12,161 per capita GNI was used, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, and Vietnam would qualify as 
developing in the TPP. Other countries would have to adhere to as yet undetermined standards 
based on language contained in the Australia, Chile, and Singapore FTAs with the United States.70  
TPP partners also reportedly have discussed an alternative proposal, adopting one standard but 
allowing developing countries to phase in compliance with those obligations.71 However, 
consensus remains lacking on whether to include these provisions at all. A November 2013 
proposal from Canada, Chile, Malaysia, and New Zealand, and Singapore omitted these 
additional patent protections.72 Recently, it has been reported that the United States is seeking to 
negotiate side letters with partner countries to pledge “favorable clarifications” on key IPR issues 
in return for accepting stronger language in a final agreement.73 
The U.S. proposal also supports pre-grant opposition procedures, which allows third parties to 
object to patents at their initial application to challenge frivolous or substandard patent 
                                                 
69 USTR, “Stakeholder Input Sharpens, Focuses U.S. Work on Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property Rights in the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership,” release, November 29, 2013, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/blog/2013/
November/stakeholder-input-sharpens-focuses-us-work-on-pharmaceutical-IP-in-TPP. This proposal replaces a prior 
U.S. offer known as the Trade Enhancing Access to Medicines (TEAM) initiative, which would have encouraged 
companies to market innovative drugs in TPP markets more quickly by making stronger patent term extensions, data 
exclusivity, and patent linkage provisions conditional to firms who apply for marketing approval for their products in 
an expedited fashioned. This proposal reportedly was roundly criticized by other TPP participants. 
70 “In TPP, U.S. Floats 12-year Data Period for Biologics, Flexibilities for Developing Countries,” Inside U.S. Trade, 
November 29, 2013. 
71 “TPP Countries Discuss Single Standard for Drug IPR Rules, With Phase-In,” Inside U.S. Trade, May 16, 2014. 
72 Ibid. 
73 “U.S. Negotiates IP Side Letters to Gain Support for TPP Pharmaceutical Demands,” Inside U.S. Trade, March 13, 
2015. 
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applications. Prior to this proposal, the United States reportedly favored eliminating pre-grant 
opposition.74 
Biologics 
The United States reportedly is seeking a 12-year period of data exclusivity for biologics under 
the proposed TPP. Biologics are medical preparations derived from living organisms, but 
generally are not considered distinct from traditional pharmaceuticals in U.S. IP law.75 
Biotechnology groups claim that the development and approval process for large molecule 
biologics—as opposed to small molecule pharmaceuticals—are more complex and require longer 
exclusivity periods for a product to be commercially viable. Under the 2010 Affordable Care Act, 
biologics are given a 12-year exclusivity period. Moreover, the USTR, in its blog release, stated 
“[t]raditionally, the U.S. approach to trade negotiations has been to base proposals on existing 
U.S. law, where the current standard is 12 years.”76 An additional question in the negotiations has 
been how to define the scope of biologic medicines, or whether to define them at all. 
Trade Secrets 
The United States is reportedly seeking language to improve protections for trade secrets, 
especially as the USTR continues to describe protection of U.S. trade secrets as a growing 
challenge in its 2014 Special 301 report on IPR protections abroad.77 This text responds to the 
concerns of U.S. business that governments have pressured them to reveal trade secrets or transfer 
technology to further a country’s “indigenous innovation” policies. Companies are also reportedly 
increasingly victimized by outright theft of their trade secrets, especially through cybertheft, and 
have decried the often lax remedies available to combat such theft. Penalties for trade secret theft 
vary widely among TPP countries; one U.S. objective in the negotiations reportedly is to require 
countries to establish criminal penalties for the theft of trade secrets.78  
In addition, other chapters in the TPP negotiations may also concern the issue of trade secrets. 
Such an agenda may involve prohibiting countries from: (1) conditioning market access on 
technology transfer; (2) seeking concessional terms for acquiring or licensing IPR by SOEs; (3) 
requiring the use of locally owned or developed IPR; (4) promoting the development of local 
standards to unfairly advantage local firms; and (5) requiring the unnecessary disclosure of 
confidential business information, or failing to protect that information.79 In addition, Malaysia 
reportedly proposed preventing countries from requiring the disclosure of proprietary formulas 
for food and food products as a condition for market access.80 It is not thought that these practices 
                                                 
74 Public Citizen, “Briefing Memo: Analysis of Leaked U.S. Paper on Eliminating Patent Pre-Grant Opposition,” July 
7, 2011 http://www.citizen.org/analysis-of-leaked-US-paper-on-eliminating-patent-pre-grant-opposition. 
75 For more information on biologics, see CRS Report R41483, Follow-On Biologics: The Law and Intellectual 
Property Issues, by John R. Thomas. 
76 USTR, “Stakeholder Input Sharpens, Focuses U.S. Work on Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property Rights in the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership,” release, November 29, 2013. 
77 USTR, 2014 Special 301 Report, pp. 16-18, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
USTR%202014%20Special%20301%20Report%20to%20Congress%20FINAL.pdf. 
78 “TPP Members Reluctant To Adopt Criminal Sanctions For Trade Secret Theft,” Inside U.S. Trade, July 22, 2013. 
79 This nonexclusive list of possible negotiating objectives was drawn from the U.S. Trade Representative’s 2014 
Special 301 Report section of trade secrets and forced technology transfer, pp. 16-18.  
80 “Civil Society Groups Air Worries About Malaysian TPP Formula Proposal,” Inside U.S. Trade, March 8, 2013. 
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are particularly egregious in any of the countries currently negotiating the TPP, but they may 
become more salient if other nations accede to the agreement.  
Rules of Origin 
Rules of origin (ROO) define those goods that originate in the FTA region and therefore are 
eligible for preferential treatment under the agreement. The negotiating teams are far along in 
their consideration of product-specific rules, seeking a single TPP rule of origin to the extent 
possible.81 The TPP participants have already agreed that the ROO would be “objective, 
transparent, and predictable.” Negotiators reportedly also have agreed that inputs produced in any 
TPP country may be cumulated so that a product produced with components made in multiple 
TPP countries can be claimed as originating within the TPP region and therefore be eligible for 
preferential treatment.  
While ROOs have been discussed in terms of market access for automobiles and concerns about 
global supply chains generally, they have proved especially contentious with regard to textiles 
and apparel.82 In all previous FTAs, the United States has used the “yarn forward” rule. This rule 
requires that an apparel product could be considered from within the FTA area, and therefore 
eligible for preferential treatment, if the entire manufacture of the product, from the spinning of 
the yarn to final assembly, has occurred within the FTA region. Representatives of the U.S. textile 
industry have argued for the tighter “yarn forward rule” to be included in the TPP.83 Some U.S. 
apparel firms, retailers, and distributors, as well as some TPP countries, including Vietnam, seek a 
less restrictive “cut and sew,” or single transformation, rule, which would allow its products 
manufactured from materials of non-TPP origin to benefit from the TPP. While U.S. negotiators 
remained committed to the yarn-forward rule, the United States and other TPP partners reportedly 
have been discussing compromise positions. For example, the United States has proposed “short-
supply provisions” to allow a certain amount of non-originating inputs in apparel assembly on a 
permanent or temporary basis and reportedly tabled an initial list of yarns and fabrics eligible for 
the short-supply designation during the Lima Round in May 2013.84 Alternatively, some have 
proposed regional value content ROOs which would allow for certain non-originating inputs to be 
used as long as originating inputs made up a certain percentage of the value of the product.85 
However, a more liberalized ROO may be opposed by U.S. FTA partners such as Mexico and 
Peru, where textile and apparel industries have been oriented to trade with the United States 
through the yarn-forward standard.86 
                                                 
81 Conversation with USTR officials.  
82 For more information, see CRS Report R42772, U.S. Textile Manufacturing and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Negotiations, by Michaela D. Platzer. 
83 Textile and Apparel Alliance for TPP, letter to USTR Ambassador Ron Kirk, February 29, 2012. 
84 TPP Short Supply Presentation, USTR, Department of Commerce, http://www.tppapparelcoalition.org/uploads/
Short_Supply_Power_Point.pdf; “TPP Partners Need Time To Evaluate U.S. ‘Short-Supply’ List for Textiles,” Inside 
U.S. Trade, May 30, 2013. 
85 “Negotiators Signal Start of Process for Resolving Apparel Rules of Origin,” Inside U.S. Trade, December 14, 2012. 
86 Jeffrey J. Schott, et al., Understanding the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Peterson Institute of International Economics, 
Policy Analysis #99, January 2013, p. 24. 
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Technical Barriers to Trade 
Technical barriers to trade (TBT) are standards and regulations that are intended ostensibly to 
protect the health and safety of consumers and for other legitimate purposes, but through design 
or implementation, discriminate against imports. In order to minimize trade distortion, WTO 
members must adhere to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. The TBT Agreement 
covers voluntary standards that industries apply, technical regulations that governments impose 
for health and safety purposes, and assessment procedures that governments employ to determine 
that a product meets required standards. The TBT Agreement establishes rules and procedures for 
member countries to follow, including making sure that standards, technical regulations, and 
conforming assessment procedures are applied non-discriminatively and in a manner not more 
trade restrictive than necessary. It addition, it requires that members practice transparency as 
regulations are developed and applied, that international standards are used where appropriate, 
and that the domestic technical regulations of trading partners are recognized as equivalent to 
domestic regulations when possible. A key provision of the agreement is that WTO members have 
a central point of inquiry from which firms can ask for information on standards and regulations. 
U.S. FTAs, including the U.S.-South Korea FTA (KORUS), expanded on the TBT agreement by, 
among other things, providing opportunities for partner countries to comment on proposed 
standards and regulations and the implementation of regulations. TPP negotiators are seeking to 
build on the KORUS FTA as a model in developing TBT provisions and are including annexes on 
sector-specific TBT commitment to harmonize their approaches to regulations in key areas.  
Transparency and Pricing of Health Care Technology and Pharmaceuticals 
The debate over access to medicines encompasses other issues beyond pharmaceutical patent 
protections. Several TPP negotiating partners administer a national formulary for medicines 
purchased by the government for their national health services.87 These formularies often rely on 
generic drugs to the extent possible to maintain availability and contain costs. The U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry has expressed concern that the practices and procedures in national 
healthcare programs, including New Zealand’s Pharmaceutical Management Agency 
(PHARMAC), which maintains their formulary, put “innovative pharmaceutical products,” often 
made in the United States, at a disadvantage. They contend that access to the country’s health care 
technology markets can be blocked by government’s use of procedures that are nontransparent or 
do not provide due process. 88 In negotiations with Australia over a similar system, the United 
States and Australia agreed to a series of consultation and transparency mechanisms designed to 
afford U.S. manufacturers an opportunity to make their case for inclusion in the formulary. New 
Zealand reportedly has ruled out changes to PHARMAC absent “reciprocal” concessions by the 
United States to federal or state-level drug pricing or reimbursement programs such as 
Medicaid.89 The United States reportedly has modified its position on a process to appeal adverse 
decisions on listing new drugs and the pricing of those drugs. In response to concerns raised by 
several U.S. NGOs on the applicability of these provisions to U.S. formularies, USTR states, 
“Nothing we are doing in TPP, including our proposals on transparency and procedural fairness, 
                                                 
87 A formulary is a list of medicines approved for prescription under a medical plan. 
88 USTR, 2014 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, March 31, 2014, p. 106. 
89 “U.S. Leaked TPP Proposal on Drug Pricing Sets Up Fight with New Zealand,” Inside U.S. Trade, November 3, 
2011. 
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will undermine or weaken the Affordable Care Act, Medicare, Medicaid, or the Veteran’s Health 
Administration.”90 
Foreign Investment 
Foreign investment has been a high priority for the United States in its FTA negotiations, 
especially regarding the right of establishment by foreign goods and services providers in the 
territory of a partner-country. Negotiators likely are discussing such issues as nondiscriminatory 
treatment of foreign investment and investors; minimum standard of treatment; rules on 
expropriation; transfer of payments of the foreign investor out of the host territory; exceptions for 
identified nonconforming measures; state-to-state and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
procedures; and prohibitions on performance requirements, such as mandatory export levels and 
local content stipulations. These provisions generally are based on the current iteration of the U.S. 
model bilateral investment treaty (BIT). 
One issue that has become contentious is whether to include an ISDS provision, which allows for 
private foreign investors to seek international arbitration against host governments to settle claims 
over alleged violations of foreign investment provisions under the agreement. Except for the FTA 
with Australia, U.S. FTAs have included an investor-state arbitration provision. The investor-state 
provision is designed to protect foreign investors from the vagaries of domestic judicial systems, 
particularly in developing countries, for example, in such cases as government expropriation of 
foreign-held assets.91 
Critics have argued that investor-state procedures give foreign investors greater protection than 
domestic investors and infringe on the sovereignty of the host government in protecting the health 
and safety of its citizens. However, provisions in the KORUS and other U.S. FTA on the shared 
understanding of expropriation states that “nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that 
are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, 
safety, the environment, and real estate price stabilization…do not constitute indirect 
expropriation.92 Nonetheless, some maintain that the threat of such suits may serve as a “chilling 
effect” preventing nation states from considering such regulations.93 
Until recently, Australia has argued against including an investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanism—although it too has investor-state provisions in many of its FTAs—thus generating 
disagreement with other TPP partners. Opposition to ISDS may stem in part from an attempt by 
Philip Morris International to use an investor state provision in an Australian-Hong Kong bilateral 
investment treaty to take the Australian government to arbitration for its requirement for plain 
packaging for cigarettes, which the company believes expropriates its trademarks. Philip Morris 
filed the suit from its Asian operations headquartered in Hong Kong.94  
                                                 
90 “U.S. Poised to Scale Back TPP Proposal on Drug Reimbursement Rules,” Inside U.S. Trade, January 17, 2014. 
91 Proponents argue that these provisions are modeled after U.S. laws and an interpretation of the “takings clause” of 
the U.S. Constitution. 
92 U.S.-South Korea FTA, Annex 11-B “Expropriation.” Similar language reportedly appears in leaked versions of the 
TPP investment chapter. 
93 “Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political Science,” by Kyla Tienhaara, (October 28, 
2010), Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration, Chester Brown, Kate Miles, eds., Cambridge University 
Press, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2065706. 
94 International Trade Daily, March 6, 2012. 
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Australia’s blanket opposition to ISDS, however, appears to have evolved under the conservative 
government of Prime Minister Tony Abbott. Australia now has indicated that it will consider 
ISDS provisions in FTAs on a case-by-case basis.95 For example, Australia did negotiate ISDS 
provisions in its FTA with South Korea, but not in its FTA with Japan, both concluded in 2014. 
Another investment-related issue that has raised some concerns relates to the ability of 
governments to impose controls on capital outflows, particularly in times of financial crises. 
Previous U.S. FTAs contain clauses which call for the free flow of capital in order to facilitate 
trade and investment. They also allow for the “prudential exception” whereby controls are 
imposed to alleviate short-term balance of payments problems in order to protect the stability of 
the financial system, among other prudential measures. Some Members of Congress have raised 
concerns that in light of global financial crises, the language in FTAs might not adequately 
preserve governmental discretion to impose controls when they see fit.96 A new approach on the 
issue by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which has pointed to the usefulness of short-
term capital controls in potentially ameliorating the effects of capital volatility during periods of 
economic instability, may also affect the outcome of the negotiations.97  
Competition Policies 
National competition laws and regulations are intended to protect consumers by ensuring that one 
firm does not so dominate a sector of the economy as to inhibit market entry and stifle 
competition. Some U.S. FTAs have included provisions to limit the trade-distorting effects of 
such laws. Among other things, U.S. FTAs require that the United States and the partner 
country(ies) inform persons from a partner country, who may be subject to administrative actions 
under domestic antitrust laws, of related hearings and provide them the opportunity to make their 
case. Under these FTAs, the partner countries agree to cooperate in enforcing competition laws 
through the exchange of information and consultation. In addition, designated monopolies and 
state-enterprises are to operate in conformance with the agreement and in accordance with 
commercial considerations.  
The November 2011 framework indicates that the TPP partners are discussing language for a 
chapter on competition policy to “promote a competitive business environment, protect 
consumers and ensure a level playing field for TPP companies.” The text will include language 
“on the establishment and maintenance of competition laws and authorities, procedural fairness in 
competition law enforcement, transparency, consumer protection, private rights of action, and 
technical cooperation.” The U.S. business community has indicated that the provisions on 
competition policy will be critical in dealing with state-owned enterprises (SOEs), particularly in 
addressing issues concerning their financing, regulation, and transparency, to ensure that they are 
not provided an unfair competitive advantage.98  
                                                 
95 “Frequently Asked Questions on Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS),” Australia Department of Foreign Affairs 
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96 International Trade Daily, May 29, 2012. 
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Trade Remedies  
Trade remedies are measures designed to provide relief to domestic industries that have been 
injured or threatened with injury by imports. They are regarded by many in Congress as an 
important trade policy tool to mitigate the adverse effects of unfairly traded imports and import 
surges on U.S. industries and workers. 
The three most commonly used trade remedies are: (1) antidumping (AD) remedies, which are 
designed to provide relief from the adverse price effects of imports sold at less than fair-market 
value; (2) countervailing duty (CVD) remedies, which are used to counter the adverse effects of 
foreign government subsidies to imports; and (3) safeguard actions, which are employed to 
permit temporary relief so that domestic industries can adjust to the adverse effects of surges in 
fairly-traded imports. These actions are sanctioned by the WTO as long as they are undertaken in 
a fair manner and are consistent with rules specified in WTO agreements.  
Congress has insisted that the United States retain the right to use trade remedies to counter unfair 
trade practices and import surges and has expressed this requirement as a priority in trade 
negotiating authority legislation. It is also reflected in existing U.S. FTAs.  
TPP participants are discussing the possibility of including such provisions in the TPP that make 
trade remedy investigations and actions more transparent and provide due process in their 
implementation.  
Labor 
One of the more controversial issues that the TPP partner countries are addressing pertains to the 
scope and depth of provisions on worker rights. Supporters of strong worker rights, such as labor 
unions and certain nongovernment organizations (NGOs), are concerned that failure to promote 
and implement these rights, including collective bargaining, could lead to the imposition of low 
wages and poor conditions for workers by firms in those countries. In so doing, U.S. workers 
would be placed at a competitive disadvantage as they compete against low-cost, low-standard 
labor practices.  
The November 2011 TPP framework for negotiations indicates that the agreement will have a 
separate labor chapter. The language in the framework is ambiguous, stating only that the chapter 
would “include commitments on labor rights protection and mechanisms to ensure cooperation, 
coordination, and dialogue on labor issues of mutual concern.” The original P-4 agreement 
includes commitments to cooperate on labor issues. 
The scope and depth of worker rights provisions in U.S. trade agreements have evolved over 
time.99 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), included labor provisions in a side 
letter requiring all Parties to enforce their own labor standards. The provisions are enforced under 
a special dispute settlement procedure attached to, but outside of, the main agreement. Based on 
the 2002 Trade Act, all subsequent FTAs, included a similar provision, but within the body of the 
agreement.  
                                                 
99 For more information, see CRS Report RS22823, Overview of Labor Enforcement Issues in Free Trade Agreements, 
by Mary Jane Bolle; and CRS Report IF10046, Worker Rights Provisions in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), by Mary 
Jane Bolle and Ian F. Fergusson. 
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More recently, under the May 10th Agreement, internationally-recognized labor principles were 
included in FTAs with Peru, Panama, South Korea, and Colombia (see text box above). The 
agreement stipulated that the four FTAs would require each of the Parties to adopt and to 
maintain five internationally-recognized worker rights contained in the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Its Follow-Up (1998) (ILO Declaration)— 
• the freedom of association;  
• the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;  
• the elimination of all forms of compulsory or forced labor;  
• the effective abolition of child labor; and  
• the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.  
These provisions are enforceable under FTA dispute settlement procedures and violations are 
subject to potential trade sanctions.  
According to a recent USTR summary of negotiating objectives in the TPP, the United States is 
pursuing provisions similar to the May 10th Agreement, as well as seeking provisions to prevent 
countries from waiving or derogating from labor provisions to attract trade and investment, and 
promoting the establishment of consultative mechanisms to monitor and address labor 
concerns.100  
Some Members of Congress have expressed reservations about adopting the May 10th Agreement 
provisions as the labor negotiating objectives going forward. They have argued that “expanding 
the scope of obligations could unduly expose the United States to potential unwarranted litigation 
and trade sanctions on a new and broader array of its labor laws and policies,” and prefer to 
expand trade capacity building measures to improve labor rights in partner countries.101 However, 
the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities Act (BCTPA) TPA legislation introduced in January 
2014 includes labor negotiating objectives consistent with the May 10th Agreement provisions 
(see “The May 10th Agreement” and “Trade Promotion Authority” textboxes). 
Worker rights may also be controversial among the TPP partners. For example, Vietnam and 
Brunei reportedly have expressed opposition to having worker rights provisions subject to 
binding dispute settlement procedures. At the Lima Round in 2013, Canada tabled its approach 
modeled after its Canada-Panama labor cooperation agreement, which does not allow for the 
suspension of trade concessions as a resolution to a labor-related dispute. Instead, a dispute 
settlement panel would be limited to mandating the development of an “action plan” to remedy a 
dispute, and if the offending party fails to implement it, a monetary penalty capped at $15 million 
could be assessed.102 This issue is likely to continue to evolve as the negotiations proceed.  
                                                 
100 Available at http://www.ustr.gov/tpp/Summary-of-US-objectives. 
101 Letter to Ambassador Ron Kirk, December 21, 2011, by Reps. Camp and Nunes, Sens. Hatch and Thune. 
102 “Canada Tables Alternative Enforcement Mechanism In TPP Labor Chapter,” Inside U.S. Trade, May 23, 2013. 
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The United States reportedly is negotiating a labor action plan (LAP) with Vietnam. This plan 
may be similar to the LAP negotiated in conjunction with the U.S. FTA with Colombia.103 That 
plan included benchmarks to be undertaken by the Colombian government to address perceived 
weaknesses in Colombian labor laws and practices within specified deadlines. It includes 
numerous commitments to protect union members and improve worker rights. On May 29, 2014, 
153 House Democrats wrote to USTR Froman requesting that the United States negotiate LAPs 
with Brunei, Malaysia, and Mexico as well. One issue concerning the LAPs is the stage in which 
they are implemented: prior to signing the agreement, or before, during, or after any potential 
congressional consideration of TPP.104  
Environment 
Like the U.S. position on worker rights, environmental provisions in U.S. FTAs have evolved 
over time. As with worker rights, environmental provisions were originally placed in side-letters 
in the NAFTA agreement, and “enforce your own laws” provisions were placed in subsequent 
FTAs with limited dispute settlement based on the Trade Act of 2002. The May 10th Agreement 
provisions (see above) added an affirmative obligation to adhere to multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) and allowed for environmental disputes under the FTAs to access the full 
dispute settlement provisions of the agreements. 
According to USTR, it has pushed for the incorporation of the May 10th Agreement as well as 
long-standing provisions in the TPP environmental talks. The U.S. position seeks commitments to 
fully enforce domestic environmental laws and laws to implement MEAs; not to waive or 
derogate from environmental protections to encourage trade or investment; provisions to combat 
wildlife trafficking, illegal logging, and fishing subsidies; and consultative mechanisms to assure 
stakeholder participation to challenge member state’s adherence to the provisions. For these 
obligations, the United States has sought binding commitments to be enforced with the same 
dispute mechanism as other provisions of the agreement.105 Subjecting the provisions of the 
environmental chapter to binding dispute settlement has proved controversial, reportedly even 
among countries that have signed U.S. FTAs with—albeit narrower—environmental chapters 
with dispute settlement provisions.106  
A secretary’s draft text of the environmental chapter was leaked in January 2014.107 Reportedly, 
this text, prepared by Canada, provides for a special dispute resolution process distinct from one 
applied to commercial disputes that would not result in trade sanctions. It also merely affirms 
each party’s intention to implement the MEAs it has signed. Both of these positions diverge from 
reported U.S. positions in the talks. USTR Ambassador Froman responded:  
U.S. negotiators have made clear where we don’t agree with weaker TPP proposals on 
environmental provisions, and just how serious we are about making sure that the obligations 
                                                 
103 For more information, see CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and 
Issues, by M. Angeles Villarreal. 
104 “153 House Dems Push for Binding Labor Plans With Four TPP Countries,” Inside U.S. Trade, May 29, 2014. 
105 USTR, “Trans-Pacific Partnership: Summary of U.S. Objectives,” http://www.ustr.gov/tpp/Summary-of-US-
objectives. 
106 “USTR Confirms Objections on Enforceability In TPP Environmental Talks,” Inside U.S. Trade, June 29, 2012.  
107 “Leaked TPP Text Underscores U.S. Isolation In Environmental Chapter Talks,” Inside U.S. Trade, January 16, 
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in the environmental chapter are subject to the same enforcement processes as obligations 
elsewhere in the TPP, including recourse to trade sanctions. It’s true that U.S. negotiators are 
fighting alone on some of these issues – but that’s exactly what we’re doing: pressing harder, 
not retreating.108 
However, press reports suggest that a subsequent leaked document from February 2014 indicates 
that the United States has sought to replace language on trade and climate change with text on 
“transition to a low-emission economy” and has sought less comprehensive language on trade and 
biodiversity.109  
E-Commerce and Data Flows  
According to the November 2011 framework, the TPP partners are negotiating provisions that 
would establish rules and procedures for trade in goods and services conveyed by the Internet and 
other electronic means. The text of the framework states that the provisions would address 
impediments to such trade, including customs duties, the digital environment, authentication of 
electronic transactions, consumer protection, localization requirements, and other provisions to 
ensure the free flow of information. 
The United States considers these provisions important with the growth of the use of electronic 
commerce in an increasingly globalized economy. Recently-concluded U.S. FTAs, such as the 
U.S.-South Korea FTA, included e-commerce provisions. They are designed to ensure that 
services distributed electronically benefit from the same protections as services distributed by 
other means. In addition, no customs duties are to be imposed on digital products, whether 
distributed electronically or via a physical medium, such as a disk, and digital products are to be 
treated in a nondiscriminatory manner. The agreement also includes provisions prohibiting 
unnecessary barriers to the free flow of information. 
In the TPP talks, the U.S. proposals reportedly contain language that would prohibit countries 
from blocking cross-border flows of data over the Internet.110 If adopted, these provisions could 
also have implications for a member state’s ability to engage in censorship of the Internet. U.S. 
high technology groups have supported unfettered cross-border data flows and opposed 
localization requirements that require data or servers to be located in-country in order to promote 
Internet-based services and cloud-computing. They claim that companies already have their own 
mechanisms in place to protect privacy and that privacy would not be undermined by open 
borders on data flows.111  
However, TPP partners, such as Australia and New Zealand, reportedly have expressed concern 
that prohibitions on local data storage could run up against their national privacy laws. Australia 
reportedly has argued that private-sector based controls would not be sufficient to protect privacy 
and has suggested alternative language to the U.S. proposal that would give governments more 
                                                 
108 Ambassador Michael Froman, blog post, January 15, 2014, 
 http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/blog/2014/January/The-US-and-Environmental-Protections-in-the-TPP. 
109 “Trade Leak Shows U.S.’s Weak Environmental Pitch, Groups Say,” Politico, February 19, 2014.  
110 “Internet Companies, Copyright Holders Clash Over Free Flow of Data Principles,” Inside U.S. Trade, October 20, 
2011. 
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discretion on controlling data flows across borders.112 Vietnam and Malaysia reportedly have 
local content restrictions, either for mercantile or censorship reasons. 
Customs and Trade Facilitation 
Customs valuation and trade facilitation have been long-standing, if unheralded, provisions in 
U.S. FTAs that aim to ease and expedite the passage of goods over borders, and reduce associated 
transaction costs. These issues, often the nuts and bolts of how goods move from country to 
country, which, along with custom valuation have figured prominently WTO negotiations and the 
WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. Such provisions have taken on new significance as global 
supply chains have increased the number of times intermediate goods cross borders and hence the 
cost of customs bottlenecks to the world economy. 
Generally, the United States indicates that it is seeking efficiencies and cooperation in this 
chapter. Common rules of origin are stressed, but those negotiations are being conducted in a 
separate chapter. Efficiencies are in the form commitments for the quick release of goods; 
expedited release of express shipments; advanced ruling on tariff classifications, valuations 
duties, or other issues; electronic processing of customs documentation, inspections based on 
risk-management techniques. The United States also seeks cooperative commitments to prevent 
smuggling, illegal transshipment, and duty evasion.113 
New and Cross-Cutting Issues  
In addition to treating certain existing issues in new or different ways, the TPP also seeks 
disciplines on certain activities not heretofore addressed in FTAs. These include not only 
horizontal or cross-cutting issues that address best practices in several negotiations, such as with 
regulatory coherence, but also issues not generally addressed in previous U.S. FTAs, such as 
regulatory coherence, supply chain competitiveness, and small- and medium-sized enterprises. 
While some of the commitments relating to these issues are in stand-alone chapters, others are 
included, as appropriate, in other chapters of the agreement. 
Regulatory Coherence 
The issue of regulatory coherence represents one of the new cross-cutting trade issues added to 
the TPP negotiations. The goal of regulatory coherence is to ease the conditions and costs of trade 
between TPP countries while affirming the rights of TPP countries to regulate their economies to 
promote legitimate policy objectives. According to the USTR, this initiative stems from the 
proliferation of regulatory and nontariff barriers, which have become a major hurdle for business 
gaining access to foreign markets. Some of the goals of the effort are to “improve regulatory 
practices, eliminate unnecessary barriers, reduce regional divergence in standards, promote 
transparency, conduct regulatory processes in a more trade-facilitative manner, eliminate 
                                                 
112 World Trade Online, July 5, 2012. 
113 USTR, “Trans-Pacific Partnership: Summary of U.S. Objectives,” http://www.ustr.gov/tpp/Summary-of-US-
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redundancies in testing and certification, and promote cooperation on specific regulatory 
issues.”114  
Issues related to regulatory coherence are covered in various chapters, including a stand-alone 
chapter on regulatory coherence as well as in SPS, TBT, and other chapters. The regulatory 
coherence chapter recommends that TPP partner countries “endeavor” to establish domestic 
regulatory structures similar to the U.S. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the 
Office of Management and Budget, a venue to vet proposed regulations, and their compliance 
with domestic law and policy, as well as with trade agreements and other international 
obligations. Aside from seeking to assure regulatory consistency among various domestic 
agencies, the proposed mechanism would be encouraged to conduct regulatory impact 
assessments (RIA) that would assess the need for a given regulation, conduct cost-benefit 
analysis, and assess alternatives to regulation. The established body, process, or mechanism 
would also seek to assure transparency and openness in the rule-making process. The draft also 
recommends the establishment of a regulatory coherence committee among TPP members. It is 
unclear, how much, if any, of these provisions would be subject to dispute settlement.115  
State-Owned Enterprises 
Broadly speaking, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are businesses directly or indirectly owned or 
influenced by a government. As such, governments may provide these businesses with 
advantages—such as subsidies, low cost credit, preferential access to government procurement, 
and trade protection—not enjoyed by their private counterparts, thereby hindering competition 
and market access. Such advantages may also be directed toward companies not owned but 
significantly favored or supported by the government. This concern over potential anti-
competitive behavior and restrictive trade has shaped texts by the United States regarding SOEs 
in the proposed TPP agreement. In the context of the current TPP negotiations, the SOE presence 
in Vietnam—estimated to represent 40% of output—may warrant particular attention, although 
Malaysia and Singapore also have important SOE sectors.116 In addition, as the TPP could 
become a template for a larger Asia-Pacific FTA or future WTO negotiations, wider applicability 
of these provisions to SOEs in other countries, particularly China, may be envisioned. 
In light of these concerns about fair competition, SOEs are addressed, though not extensively, in 
several existing U.S. FTAs. NAFTA and subsequent U.S. FTAs with Australia, Chile, Colombia, 
Peru, and South Korea have similar language on SOEs. Though the specific details vary among 
these agreements, most contain national treatment, nondiscrimination, and transparency 
provisions, while upholding the prerogative of countries to establish and maintain SOEs. The 
U.S.-Singapore FTA includes somewhat more extensive provisions on SOEs, but they largely 
apply only to Singapore and not the United States.117 
                                                 
114 “Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Trade Ministers’ Report to Leaders,” November 12, 2011, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/november/trans-pacific-partnership-tpp-trade-
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115 The draft text is available at http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/
TransPacificRegulatoryCoherence.pdf; See also “ U.S. Proposal for TPP Regulatory Coherence Chapter Mostly 
Nonbinding,” November 4, 2011. 
116 Economist Intelligence Unit, Vietnam Country Report, March 2012, p. 12. 
117 For instance, the agreement states that Singapore’s government must ensure that any government enterprise “acts 
solely in accordance with commercial considerations in its purchase or sale of goods or services” and that Singapore 
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Though some business groups, government officials, and labor groups have all expressed an 
interest in strong SOE provisions in the TPP, it remains unclear what form such provisions may 
take.118 Such measures may include provisions that seek to ensure that SOEs operate on a 
commercial basis, and to address potential trade and investment barriers. SOE disciplines may be 
enforced based on a harm test similar to that used in the WTO subsidies agreement.119 Broadly, 
these provisions will likely seek to achieve competitive neutrality with regard to SOEs. 
Competitive neutrality, a concept supported by both U.S. government and business groups, refers 
to an environment in which SOEs receive no competitive advantages beyond those enjoyed by 
private sector companies.120 
Not all policy observers, however, agree on the appropriate strength or even necessity of SOE 
provisions in the TPP. Though the scale and the nature of their behavior differ, SOEs exist in 
some form in all TPP countries. In the United States for example, organizations such as the 
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and the U.S. Postal Service are operated by 
the government and provide market-oriented products.121 Therefore, as with most trade 
negotiations, the U.S. position on SOEs likely seeks to balance both U.S. defensive and offensive 
interests.122 Some observers suggest that existing regulations may already adequately temper 
advantages of SOEs (e.g., subsidies, financing), while others maintain that additional provisions, 
particularly regarding transparency, will only make existing disciplines more effective.123  
The United States first tabled its SOE proposal in late 2011. Australia tabled alternative SOE 
language in 2013. TPP partner countries have reportedly generally agreed on a definition of and 
general provisions regarding SOEs, but negotiations continue over what exceptions will be 
allowed.124 Some countries such as Vietnam may be seeking exceptions for a significant portion 
of their SOEs.125 Negotiators have reportedly acknowledged that SOEs operate in all TPP 
countries and are working to craft disciplines that do not prevent their proper operations.126 
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Competitiveness and Global Supply Chains  
Trade in intermediate goods is an increasingly important component of international trade for 
many firms. These intermediate goods, which serve as inputs in the production of final goods, 
accounted for more than half of all nonfuel merchandise traded in 2009.127 Such intermediate 
goods represent stages along a global supply chain—the path a good takes as it is transformed 
from its basic components into a final product used by consumers. This path often crosses 
multiple international borders, sometimes more than once. U.S. imports from China, for example, 
may contain components sourced from other parts of East Asia, Europe, Latin America, and 
elsewhere, including from the United States. The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) 
estimates that 8.3% of the value of U.S. imports is actually U.S. components that have been 
incorporated into other goods abroad and re-imported into the United States.128 
It is unclear exactly how the TPP will address supply chains, although the issue will be addressed 
in a stand-alone chapter as well as in other chapters covering issues related to supply chains. The 
broad range of issues affecting supply chains involve many chapters already included in U.S. 
FTAs. Business groups have encouraged negotiators to consider several aspects that may affect 
the flow of goods into and out of TPP countries, and, hence the competitiveness in global supply 
chains of firms in TPP countries. These include harmonization of standards, adequate 
infrastructure (ports, roads, etc.) to facilitate trade; simplification of rules of origin; and greater 
customs efficiency.129  
Competitive supply chains and strong rules of origin may not always be mutually consistent 
goals. As a regional FTA, some international supply chains may be encompassed by the current 
negotiating partners. Other supply chains, however, may incorporate intermediate goods that have 
moved into TPP countries at some point in the production process. These supply chains that 
incorporate goods originating outside TPP countries, such as apparel production in Vietnam that 
uses Chinese fabric, may present a challenge to negotiators as they try to develop rules of origin 
that balance a desire for a TPP that ensures competitiveness and cost efficiency with concerns 
over outside countries benefitting from the TPP agreement without adhering to its requirements.  
Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (firms with less than 500 employees by the U.S. 
definition) account for the majority of firms involved in international trade (about 97%), but they 
account for a much smaller share of the value of U.S. trade (about 30%).130 In fact, in 2009, eight 
firms alone accounted for more than 10% of all U.S. exports.131 SMEs, however, also participate 
                                                 
127 World Trade Organization and the Institute of Developing Economies, Trade Patterns and Global Value Chains in 
East Asia: From Trade in Goods to Trade in Tasks, 2011. 
128 USITC, The Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import Restraints, Investigation No. 332-325, Publication 4253, 
August 2011, p. xv, http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4253.pdf. 
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in trade indirectly as suppliers, feeding parts and components into the supply chain of larger, 
finished products that can be exported. Though SMEs represent a relatively small share of U.S. 
trade, they employ approximately half of the U.S. workforce in the nonfarm private sector.132 In 
addition, academic studies have shown that small businesses create disproportionately more jobs 
than large businesses, though this may be due more to their age than their size—small firms are 
typically also young firms.133  
The characteristics of SMEs and their relatively small presence in U.S. trade have led to 
government efforts to improve SME access to international markets. The USTR commissioned a 
series of reports from the ITC regarding the role of SMEs in U.S. exporting activities.134 Those 
reports identified barriers limiting SME access to foreign markets, and surveyed SMEs for 
suggestions on policy changes that could ease SME exporting activities. An increased focus on 
FTAs and other trading agreements was among the top three most frequent responses provided.135 
The proposed TPP agreement includes a stand-alone chapter on SMEs, although provisions 
related to SMEs are included in other chapters. This chapter may focus on SME’s capacity to take 
advantage of the enhanced trading opportunities gained through the potential FTA. Though details 
of the agreement remain sparse, the TPP country trade ministers’ statement suggests that the 
agreement will address concerns SMEs “have raised about the difficulty in understanding and 
using FTAs.”136 For example, a representative from USTR suggested that the agreement will 
attempt to address informational challenges SMEs have cited, such as access to foreign country 
tariff schedules and regulations affecting imports.137 The negotiations on the SME chapter were 
concluded during the Dallas round in May 2012.138 The quick conclusion on this topic may 
represent both a broad consensus among the negotiating partners and relatively uncontroversial 
provisions. 
Institutional Issues 
The proposed TPP likely will contain provisions related to dispute settlement and governance of 
the agreement. Given that the proposed TPP is being touted as a “living agreement,” being open 
to new members, formal procedures may be established for new members to accede to the 
agreement. 
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Secretariat 
The existence or characteristics of a secretariat for the proposed TPP may be under consideration 
during the negotiations. Generally, U.S. FTAs have had minimal structures. From NAFTA 
onward, they have included a commission co-chaired by USTR and trade ministers of the 
respective parties to the agreement. Primarily, they have been tasked with: (1) supervising the 
implementation of the agreement; (2) resolving disputes arising from its interpretation or 
application (see dispute settlement, below); and (3) supervising work of committees established 
under the agreement. The commission meets regularly once a year, and by special session at the 
request of a party. The agreements often have created committees on specific issues. KORUS has 
working-level committees on outward processing zones and fisheries. However, U.S. agreements 
do not have free-standing secretariats, and activities are carried out by staff in member’s 
respective trade ministries.139 Similarly, the P-4 agreement has a commission, but does not have a 
standing secretariat, although New Zealand serves a repository of documents. However, other 
economic organizations in the Asia-Pacific region, such as ASEAN and APEC, do have 
secretariats that engage in trade capacity building and technical assistance activities, as well as 
conduct studies for and about their members. Negotiators may debate the question of whether 
having a formal secretariat is necessary or desirable to implement this agreement, especially 
given the number of participants. 
Dispute Settlement 
Previous U.S. FTAs as well as the P-4 agreement provide options to resolve disputes arising 
under the agreement. These are in addition to procedures with regard to investor-state dispute 
resolution (discussed above), or specialized provisions for certain disputes—for example, motor 
vehicles in the U.S.-Korea FTA.140 In general, these agreements are designed to resolve disputes 
in a cooperative manner. A party first seeks redress of a grievance through a request for 
consultation with the other party. These steps include 
• initial consultations; 
• meeting of the joint committee representing Cabinet-level trade officials of each 
parties; and 
• establishment of a dispute settlement panel. 
In previous agreements, panels have been composed of three arbiters, of which each side appoints 
one and the third is appointed by mutual consent, or failing that, by lot from a list of individuals 
not nationals of either side. After the panel makes its decision, the unsuccessful party would be 
expected to remedy the measure or practice under dispute. If it does not, compensation, 
suspension of benefits, or fines have been traditional remedies. In addition, WTO dispute 
settlement may also be used in instances where the dispute is common to both WTO and FTA 
rules. Although State-State dispute settlement has been infrequent under U.S. FTAs, the size of 
the potential agreement, the inclusion of new members, and the negotiation of new provisions 
                                                 
139 The NAFTA Commissions for Labor Cooperation and on Environmental Cooperation are an exception as they do 
have free-standing secretariats. 
140 For more detailed information on the U.S.-South Korea FTA dispute settlement process, see CRS Report R41779, 
Dispute Settlement in the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), by Brandon J. Murrill.  
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may cause negotiators to scrutinize existing models of FTA dispute settlement to meet the 
challenges this agreement may bring.  
One question is whether dispute settlement will cover all the provisions of the agreement. The 
May 10th Agreement stipulated that labor and environmental provisions would be fully 
enforceable under U.S. FTAs, and dispute settlement to those provisions in the Colombia, Peru, 
Panama, and South Korea FTAs. Whether these provisions apply to the TPP have proven 
controversial both domestically, and among TPP partners in the negotiations.  
A “Living Agreement” 
The TPP has been envisaged as a “living agreement,” one that is both open to new members 
willing to sign up to its commitments and open to addressing new issues as they evolve. Thus far, 
the manner in which new members are added while the negotiations are still under way, as with 
the case of Canada, Mexico, and Japan, has followed a process agreed by current members 
informally, with each aspiring candidate being approved with the consensus of the other parties. 
In practice, the aspiring participant must not only agree to negotiate saying that “everything is on 
the table,” but must show in words, deeds, or perception that there is a genuine willingness to 
negotiate on issues sensitive to others and to commit to the standards of the eventual agreement. 
This has led to months of bilateral consultations on issues of interest to the other parties and 
confidence building measures in areas of the greatest sensitivity.  
In the case of Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand had concerns about 
Canada’s supply management system for dairy and poultry. The United States was also interested 
in leveraging action on Canada’s then-languishing legislation to modernize its copyright laws. In 
return for entry in the talks, Canada and Mexico reportedly agreed not to seek to reopen chapters 
already agreed in the TPP, or possibly, sub-chapters that contained areas of agreement. Japan, 
meanwhile, agreed to commitments regarding its beef, auto, and insurance sectors, in order to 
become a negotiating partner in the TPP talks. 
While the expansion of the group has been publicly contemplated, as a trans-Pacific agreement, to 
date it has focused first on APEC countries. Of these, there are many potential candidates, from 
relatively advanced economies such as South Korea and Taiwan, to middle-income states with 
dynamic economies and youthful populations like Thailand or the Philippines. Other countries 
beyond APEC, such as Colombia and Costa Rica, have expressed interest, and it is conceivable 
that additional countries or trade blocs beyond the Pacific shores could link up to the agreement 
in the future.  
No new members are expected to join the negotiations at this stage, but may accede later to the 
final agreement. For example, South Korea has expressed interest in participating in the talks, but 
U.S. Administration officials suggest this would most likely occur after existing negotiations 
conclude.141 Some observers have suggested that South Korea could also join the TPP after the 
negotiations conclude but before the agreement is implemented.142 The accession process raises 
                                                 
141 USTR, “Statement by U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman on Korea’s Announcement Regarding the Trans-
Pacific Partnership,” press release, November 29, 2013, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/
November/Froman-statement-TPP-Korea. 
142 Jeffrey J.Schott and Cathleen Cimino, Should Korea Join the Trans-Pacific Partnership?, Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, Policy Brief PB14-22, September 2014. 
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the question of whether a country, especially one with political or economic heft, can be expected 
to simply join an agreement already negotiated or whether it should have input on the existing 
agreement, especially if the goal is to produce a free trade area for the Asia-Pacific, or beyond. 
Yet, reopening the agreement’s substantive provisions with each new entrant—as opposed to its 
market access provisions which presumably would need to be negotiated with each existing 
member anyhow—offers up its own difficulties. The WTO accession process, whereby countries 
agree to the established WTO trade rules but negotiate on market access, could serve as a 
template. 
The “Noodle Bowl” 
Differences of opinion exist among the participants as to how best and to what extent the TPP 
will serve to harmonize trade rules among the parties. They have agreed to pursue a single set of 
TPP rules of origin, which will be key to achieving this goal. However, they are pursuing 
different approaches to developing a TPP tariff schedule. The United States has maintained that it 
is negotiating market access bilaterally and only with the TPP participants with which it does not 
have FTAs: Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Vietnam. Other participants have sought 
to negotiate plurilateral market access schedules. While the participants have agreed to conduct 
the tariff negotiations as they choose, they have agreed to develop a single TPP tariff schedule 
that will support the goal of facilitating trade. However, it is known that some participants seek to 
reopen the market access provisions of their prior FTAs with the United States or others. For 
example, Australia is known to seek a better market access for its sugar in the United States than 
it received in its FTA. Through TPA, or other vehicle, Congress may wish to make its views 
known about the architecture of the agreement. 
Issues for Congress 
Congress has taken a strong interest in the TPP negotiations since the negotiations were launched 
in 2008. Hearings have been held, and many Members have expressed views on the negotiations 
through letters and consultations with the Administration and with stakeholder groups. As the 
negotiations proceed, a number of issues important to Congress are emerging. 
Negotiating a “Comprehensive, High-Standard” Agreement 
An issue for U.S. policy makers in general, and Congress in particular, is whether the United 
States will be able to achieve its objective of creating a “comprehensive, high-standard” 
agreement that encompasses a broad spectrum of trade and trade-related issues. As the largest 
FTA negotiated by the United States, it brings together a large and expanding group of countries 
representing various levels of development. Likewise, with multiple chapters under negotiation, it 
is the most comprehensive agreement in terms of breadth and depth of commitment undertaken 
by the United States. At the same time, the United States and the other TPP partners are aiming 
for a comprehensive agreement to provide a structure for trade within the Asia-Pacific region in 
the 21st century, and to approach other issues not currently being addressed at the WTO. 
Members of Congress have already presented differing views on which countries should be 
included in a TPP, and on what constitutes “high-standards” in such areas as worker rights, 
intellectual property rights, protection for pharmaceuticals, and investor rights. In addition, some 
Members of Congress have expressed an interest in broadening the negotiations to include issues 
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such as exchange rates, which the Administration acknowledges as important, but has to date 
preferred to address through other venues.143 Likewise, outside the United States, the course of 
the negotiations has revealed differences on the meaning of “high-standard” among the 
negotiating partners. This emerging debate may presage a vigorous debate within Congress on the 
TPP as the process proceeds and Members continue to weigh in with their views.  
The Role and Timing of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and 
Congressional Trade Negotiating Objectives 
Any trade agreement that the United States reaches with TPP partners would have to be approved 
by Congress through the passage of implementing legislation, presumably under TPA procedures 
(see text box on TPA). The latest TPA expired on July 1, 2007, although the Obama 
Administration has proceeded to negotiate the proposed TPP as if TPA were in effect. It has 
consulted with Congress and followed TPA’s procedural steps. For example, former USTR Ron 
Kirk formally notified Congress of the Administration’s intention to enter into negotiations with 
the TPP countries on December 14, 2009, 90 days prior to beginning the negotiations, as 
stipulated under the expired TPA.  
Although the Administration has been consulting Members and congressional staff, Congress, as 
a whole, formally has yet to weigh in in the form of negotiating objectives embedded in TPA 
authorizing statutes. In the past, these objectives have included reducing barriers to various types 
of trade (e.g., goods, services, agriculture, electronic commerce); protecting foreign investment 
and intellectual property rights; encouraging transparency, fair regulatory practices, and anti-
corruption; ensuring that countries protect the environment and worker rights; providing for an 
effective dispute settlement process; and protecting the U.S. right to enforce its trade remedy 
laws. However, over the years, Congress has revised and expanded the negotiating objectives as 
policy issues have evolved and the global trading system has become more complex. In any 
renewal of TPA, Congress may wish to establish new negotiating objectives to reflect 21st-century 
trade policy, including issues currently under negotiation such as state-owned enterprises, 
regulatory coherence, digital technology, and trade in green technologies, among other areas. At 
the same time, the objectives would likely have to be flexible enough to allow the Administration 
to negotiate a “living agreement” that can change and be kept current with an evolving 
international trading system. 
Exchange Rates and TPP
Some Members of Congress are calling for “currency manipulation” to be addressed in the proposed TPP. In June 
2013, 230 Representatives sent a letter to President Obama urging the Administration to address unfair exchange 
rate policies in the TPP.144 In September 2013, 60 Senators sent a letter to the Treasury Secretary, Jacob Lew, and 
the U.S. Trade Representative, Michael Froman, asking them to address currency manipulation in the TPP and all 
future free trade agreements.145 Both letters cite a December 2012 study by the Peterson Institute for International 
                                                 
143 Washington Trade Daily, October 17, 2013, p. 3. 
144 Representative Mike Michaud, “Majority of House Members Push Obama to Address Currency Manipulation in 
TPP,” Press Release, June 6, 2013, http://michaud.house.gov/press-release/majority-house-members-push-obama-
address-currency-manipulation-tpp. 
145 Senator Debbie Stabenow, “Sixty Senators Urge Administration to Crack Down on Currency Manipulation in 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Talks,” Press Release, September 24, 2013, http://www.stabenow.senate.gov/?p=
press_release&id=1171. 
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Economics (PIIE), which estimates that “currency manipulation” has caused the U.S. trade deficit to increase by $200 
billion to $500 billion per year and the U.S. economy to lose between 1 million and 5 million jobs.146 In July 2013, 
Congressman Levin released a specific proposal to address unfair exchange rate practices in the TPP.147 Addressing 
“currency manipulation” is also identified as a principal negotiating objective in the TPA legislation introduced in the 
House and the Senate in the 113th Congress (H.R. 3830; S. 1900). As TPP negotiations progress, it is not clear to 
what extent negotiators are discussing exchange rate issues. 
Generally, Member concerns about currency issues focus on the claim that certain countries are using, or have used 
in the past, various economic policies to lower the value of their currency in order to unfairly boost exports at the 
expense of other countries, including the United States. Traditionally, concerns have been raised about countries that 
have prolonged, sustained interventions in foreign exchange markets to artificially weaken the value of their currency, 
meaning that they are selling domestic currency in exchange for foreign currency. More recently, concerns have also 
been raised about the effects of expansionary monetary policy on exchange rate levels. 
In the context of the TPP, congressional concerns appear to be focused on Japan. In 2013, the Central Bank of Japan 
embarked on a package of expansionary monetary policies, as part of a larger economic reform program nicknamed 
“Abenomics,” that aims to grow Japan’s economy and eliminate deflation (falling prices). Most economists agree that 
Japan’s expansionary monetary policies are focused on increasing aggregate demand, similar to the motivations for 
quantitative easing in the United States, rather than targeting a specific exchange rate value. That said, the change in 
monetary policy has contributed to a weakening in Japan’s currency, the yen, which fell by 40% against the dollar 
between mid-2012 and the end of September 2014.148 Additionally, Japan has, in the past, intervened in currency 
markets, meaning it has sold yen in exchange for foreign currencies in order to decrease the value of the yen. Japan is 
believed to have last intervened in currency markets in 2011.  
Although congressional concerns have been focused on Japan, analysts have also voiced concerns about the exchange 
rate practices of other TPP member countries. The PIIE study identifies two TPP countries—Malaysia and 
Singapore—as among the most significant “currency manipulators.”149 
Given the effect that exchange rates can have on trade, some policy makers argue that addressing unfair exchange 
rate policies should be an integral part of a trade agreement to create a “level playing field,” even if such provisions 
would be novel in the context of a free trade agreement. The U.S. auto industry in particular has been supportive of 
efforts to address currency manipulation in TPP.150 Proponents of including currency provisions in TPP argue that 
other efforts to address currency manipulation, such as through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have not 
been fruitful and that other avenues, like trade agreements, need to be pursued. 
Others argue that seeking to include currency issues in a trade agreement is not a straight-forward process and could 
make the agreement more difficult to conclude. For example, there are different views about how currency issues 
could or should be addressed in trade agreements. Some have called for enforceable provisions, but there may be 
disagreement over how exchange rate disputes would be adjudicated, while others have called for cooperative 
frameworks to examine currency issues. There is also disagreement among economists about how to define currency 
manipulation and what benchmarks should be used. 
Still others caution that there may be a number of reasons to refrain from taking action on exchange rate disputes. A 
key reason is that U.S. imports from countries with weak currencies may be less expensive than they would be 
otherwise, benefitting U.S. consumers and U.S. businesses that rely on inputs from abroad. 
Note: This section prepared by Rebecca M. Nelson. For more information about current debates over exchange 
rates, see CRS Report R43242, Current Debates over Exchange Rates: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Rebecca M. 
Nelson, and CRS In Focus IF10049, Debates over “Currency Manipulation”, by Rebecca M. Nelson. 
                                                 
146 C. Fred Bergsten and Joseph E. Gagnon, “Currency Manipulation, the US Economy, and the Global Economic 
Order,” Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief 12-25, December 2012, http://www.iie.com/
publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=2302. 
147 U.S. Representative Sander Levin, “U.S.-Japan Automotive Trade: Proposal to Level the Playing Field,” 
http://www.piie.com/publications/papers/levin20130723proposal.pdf. 
148 Federal Reserve. 
149 Bergsten and Gagnon, op. cit. 
150 For example, see Michael Stumo, “American Auto Industry Applauds Senate Currency Letter,” Trade Reform, 
September 25, 2013. 
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The timing of TPA may also have an impact on the negotiations and potential congressional 
consideration of the TPP. Observers have asserted that TPP partners will not engage in serious 
negotiations on the most sensitive issues without the assurance that U.S. commitments are 
credible and cannot be amended by Congress. Some officials from TPA partner countries have 
stated that TPA is necessary to conclude the TPP negotiations,151 while others have been reluctant 
to remark on what they see as a domestic U.S. political process.152 Meanwhile, some Members of 
Congress, including Chairman Hatch of the Senate Finance Committee, view TPA as critical for 
the conclusion of TPP, suggesting at a recent trade policy hearing that “it would be a grave 
mistake for the administration to close TPP before Congress enacts TPA,”153 while others, such as 
Ranking Member Levin of the House Committee on Ways and Means, would like to focus on the 
substance of the TPP provisions before considering TPA.154 
In July 2013, President Obama requested that Congress reauthorize TPA. Bicameral legislation 
(H.R. 3830/S. 1900)—the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities Act of 2014 (BCTPA)—was 
introduced in the 113th Congress but not considered. The President reiterated his request for TPA 
in his January 2015 State of the Union address to the new Congress. At this time no TPA 
legislation has been introduced in the 114th Congress, but Chairman Ryan of the House 
Committee on Ways and Means and Chairman Hatch of the Senate Finance Committee have both 
announced TPA as a top legislative priority. 
Institutional Issues 
In addition, Congress may wish to consider the institutional structure of a future TPP agreement. 
It may wish to consider the manner in which the agreement can be expanded, or the terms to 
which it is willing to agree to expand to new members. As well as attracting new members, new 
content may be negotiated, or existing content renegotiated. In the manner of accession of new 
members, Congress may consider whether it would approve each new member, or whether U.S. 
approval would be handled in a manner similar to WTO accessions. In terms of content, Congress 
may also wish to consider whether the TPP, if concluded, would have a Secretariat or other body 
that could serve as a venue for continuing negotiations.  
Relationship with the Multilateral System 
A successfully concluded TPP agreement may shape the future course of multilateral trade 
liberalization. After 10 years of negotiations, the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations is 
at an impasse, and WTO members are developing new approaches to address global trade 
issues.155 TPP may offer an opportunity for a group of countries dedicated to concluding a 
                                                 
151 “No TPA, No TPP, Says Canada,” Washington Trade Daily, October 10, 2014, p. 2. 
152 “Robb Says Basic TPP Deal Possible by Year’s End, but Political Will Uncertain,” Inside U.S. Trade, October 2, 
2014. 
153 Senate Committee on Finance, “Hatch Statement at Finance Hearing on President Obama’s 2015 Trade Agenda,” 
press release, January 27, 2015, http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Hatch%20Statement%20Hearing%20on%20President%20Obamas%202015%20Trade%20Agenda.pdf. 
154 House Committee on Ways and Means, “Opening Statement of Ranking Member Sander Levin, Hearing on the U.S. 
Trade Policy Agenda,” press release, January 27, 2015, http://levin.house.gov/press-release/opening-statement-ranking-
member-sander-levin-hearing-us-trade-policy-agenda. 
155 Preliminary discussions for a plurilateral agreement to update the commitments in the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services have been held.  
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comprehensive, high-standards FTA to break new ground on issues thus far not negotiated at the 
multilateral level.  
Past FTAs, such as NAFTA, incorporated new trade policy ideas, such as dispute settlement and 
intellectual property rights, that were concurrently being negotiated in the Uruguay Round. 
NAFTA was approved first, and the approval of NAFTA among Canada, Mexico and the United 
States helped push the Uruguay Round to conclusion. Today, the approval of a comprehensive, 
high-standard TPP agreement could signal to recalcitrant members of the WTO that trade 
liberalization can proceed without them and might spur action at the multilateral level.  
However, the world trading system is much different than it was in the early 1990s when NAFTA 
signatories (United States and Canada) made up half of the so-called “Quad-countries” (United 
States, Canada, the European Union, and Japan) that decided the Uruguay Round. Developing 
countries, such as Brazil, India, and China, that now exercise their interests in the WTO, may be 
more assertive in pursuing their own interests. Yet, as an alternative venue promoting trade 
liberalization at the time when the WTO is not seen to be doing so, it may attract additional 
countries to the negotiations. 
The Potential Impact of the TPP on U.S. Trade Policy  
The U.S. pursuit of the TPP and the possible outcome of the negotiations raise other questions 
regarding its possible impact on the status and shape of current and future U.S. trade policy. For 
example, how will the TPP talks and potential final agreement relate to the recently launched 
U.S.-EU FTA negotiations (Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership or T- TIP)?156 If both 
negotiations concluded successfully could they be eventually be merged? 
Similarly, the TPP raises the issue of the United States and the future of the WTO as a major force 
for trade liberalization. Some may argue, for example, that the United States has signaled the 
death knell of future rounds of multilateral agreements in favor of regional pacts. Others might 
assert that the TPP could serve as a building block for a more viable multilateral trade system that 
responds to trade challenges of the 21st century. Some may even say that the TPP may become the 
predominant force for trade liberalization going forward, that is, if it can be agreed to by the 
current parties. 
Another issue for possible consideration is: What would be the impact on U.S. trade policy if the 
TPP negotiations are not completed successfully or are delayed indefinitely? Some could argue 
that such an outcome would indicate that it is not feasible to negotiate a comprehensive set of 
rules with a diverse group of countries and that the United States would have to tailor its 
ambitions. In addition, some might assert that such an outcome would signify a temporary, if not 
permanent setback to the notion of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). Still others 
may conclude that such result could force the United States to retreat from negotiating trade 
agreements altogether.  
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Investment Partnership (T-TIP): In Brief, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Vivian C. Jones. 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations and Issues for Congress 
 
Congressional Research Service 54 
Conclusion 
The potential Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement has strategic policy implications for the United 
States, including with respect to trade policy, but the substance of the proposed agreement and its 
future remain undecided. The agreement is ambitious in at least three ways: (1) in terms of its 
size—it would be the largest U.S. FTA by trade flows and could expand in a region that 
represents over half of all U.S. trade; (2) the scope and scale of its liberalization—the negotiating 
partners have expressed an intent to comprehensively reduce barriers in goods, services, and 
agricultural trade as well as rules and disciplines on a wide range of topics including new policy 
issues that neither the WTO nor existing FTAs yet cover; and (3) its flexibility—this “living 
agreement” has been and may continue to be expanded in terms of its membership and its trade 
and investment disciplines.  
Due to this level of ambition, however, achieving such an agreement may be difficult. Differences 
in opinion exist, both domestically and among the negotiating partners, on precisely what form 
the agreement’s provisions should take. A broad range of U.S. interests groups view the TPP as a 
way to “correct” flaws in previous U.S. FTAs, but changes that some groups consider 
improvements to U.S. trade policy others see as unwarranted intrusions into public policy, or as 
factors that contribute to economic insecurity for some Americans. Even challenges with “20th-
century” trade issues, such as market access for goods, have yet to be resolved among the TPP 
partners.  
Yet, the partner countries have expressed their commitment to achieving this ambitious agreement 
and the negotiators remain positive about the progress being made. This group of countries has 
self-selected into the negotiations presumably because it sees the TPP as a catalyst to greater 
economic growth and prosperity, especially if it is expanded to include other countries. In 
addition, the large network of existing FTAs among the members could be seen as an indicator of 
their willingness to cooperate on trade issues and may imply that some of the challenging issues 
have already been addressed.  
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